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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2013, when the Islamic State, or "ISIS," was still an
unknown entity to most Americans, the Senate Armed Services Committee
called a hearing over the conflict with al Qaeda.1 The senators had two simple
underlying questions for the executive branch officials before them, which
surfaced often throughout the hearing: Who is the enemy, and how much power
have we given the President to decide that question? 2
The ambiguity traces to a statute passed in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11 attack, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF). The AUMF authorizes the President to use force against the
individuals and organizations that committed the September 11 attacks, or
those who harbored them.' Though not explicitly named, these entities have
been widely understood as signifying al Qaeda and the Taliban.' But since
2001, Presidents have invoked that statute to use force against other groups
they determine are connected to al Qaeda, and in places far beyond the original
Afghanistan battlefield.
The Senators' questions thus struck at the heart of one of the thorniest
legal questions that has arisen in the prosecution of this novel war. When the
enemy is a global terrorist group-such as al Qaeda or ISIS-rather than a
state, how does the President's authority to wage war change as the
organization expands, contracts, or splits apart, and as new individuals and
groups support or join the fight?
To answer these questions, the Committee hauled before it the top
lawyers from the Pentagon and State Department and peppered them with
questions.5 The lawyers' answers generally seemed to placate the Members.
The President's power under the 2001 AUMF is not unlimited, they confirmed.
But under the Executive's now longstanding interpretation, that statutory
authority extends beyond core al Qaeda to groups that join the fight, or "cobelligerents," a claim they asserted stemmed from a "well-established"
principle in international law. In other words, as executive officials interpret the
1.
The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter
2013 SASC Hearing]. The Islamic State, or "ISIS," which stands for the "Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria," is also known as the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL), and "Daesh," which is the
English transliteration of the Arabic acronym of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa ash-Sham, the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham.
2.
Though the Administration's lawyers were not prepared with a list of organizations
considered to fall within the AUMF at the time of the hearing, the Committee notes state that the
Administration subsequently provided a "classified paper" to Senate staff, which could have included
such a list. See 2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1, at 13. Two years later, in the spring of 2015, in a
speech before the American Society of International Law, Department of Defense (DOD) General
Counsel Stephen Preston presented a list of groups against whom the Administration deemed it had
authority, under the 2001 AUMF, to use force at that point in time. See Stephen W. Preston, Gen.
Counsel, Dep't. of Defense, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law: The Legal Framework for the United States' Use of Military Force Since 9/I l(Apr. 10, 2015)
[hereinafter Preston Speech].
3.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
4.
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
5.
2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1.
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statute, Congress has authorized the President to use force against groups
connected to al Qaeda whom international law would construe as enemies of
the United States. The President's domestic statutory authority thus turns on his
interpretation of international law. And this interpretation of Congress's intent,
these government lawyers added at further prompting from the Senators, has
6
been subject to litigation and ratified by the courts.
Well, said the Senators, in so many words, in that case, carry on .... 7
This study suggests that the Senators should have probed deeper. Behind
the executive branch assurances of a clear standard for interpreting the
President's AUMF authority, founded in a "well-established" principle of
international law called "co-belligerency," in fact lay an internally-contested
amalgam of legal theories based in novel and in some instances flawed
interpretations of international law. While that amalgam of theories and internal
tension themselves may operate as some impediment to executive action, it is
far from the solid and established-and clearly constraining-bright line legal
principle the Executive has repeatedly suggested.
This Article traces the origins and evolving narrative of the Executive's
modern co-belligerency theory to explore how the Executive shapes the
boundaries of its war powers. This is also a study of how a creative legal
theory-intended both to constrain and to defend presidential power-sprouted
and took root within the executive branch, evolved internally into competing
legal theories, became entrenched through ideologically opposed presidential
administrations, judicial deference and congressional acquiescence, and
ultimately became the poorly understood law of the land and a basis for
Scholars have referred to this kind of abdication of responsibility by the courts and
6.
Congress through over-zealous deference on matters they should be competent to resolve themselves as
"a cycle of deferral" or "circular buck-passing." See Kristin A. Collins, Deference and Deferral, in THE
PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL 79 (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine Young
eds., 2016); David Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113,
129 (1993). Under Collins's and Strauss's theories, each branch defers to what is presumed to be the
other's resolution of the matter, but in fact "no one ever addresses the constitutional issue." Strauss,
supra at 129. In this case, the issue is one of statutory interpretation; yet these Members of Congress
have generally deferred to the courts' view of Congress 's intent.
Though many bills have been proposed in the three years since that hearing, particularly
7.
in light of the emerging threat from ISIS, Congress has yet to amend the 2001 AUMF, or pass new
legislation, either restricting or expanding that grant of authority. It has, however, continued to
appropriate funds for the ongoing conflict. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 28, Smith v. Obama,
No. 16-843 (D.D.C. July 11, 2016), ECF No. 9 (detailing Congress's appropriations and suggesting that
this serves as a form of ratification of the Executive's activities). There have been subsequent exchanges
between executive branch officials and senate and congressional committees, but I have uncovered none
that have provided significant additional illumination. Shortly following the 2013 hearing, the Senate
Armed Services Committee sent a letter to the Attorney General inquiring, inter alia: "If the United
States is authorized to use military force against a state or non-state actor under domestic and
international law, does that authority extend, without having to be explicit and without the need for
further authorization, to co-belligerents who have aligned themselves with that entity and joined the
fight against the United States?" SASC Letter of May 17, 2013. The Committee did not clarify whether
it was questioning the United States authority as a whole, or the President's, or whether the
"authorization" at issue was the AUMF or some other domestic or intemational law authority, but it did
request the Executive's supporting analysis. Id. The Executive has since released reports naming the
groups it has determined to be associated forces of al Qaeda, and thus to fall within the AUMF. E.g.,
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON ASSOCIATED FORCES (2014). In that report, the Executive explicitly
reserves the right to label additional groups as associated forces "whenever a situation arises." Id. at 3.
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perpetuating an aggressive scope of unilateral executive power and expanding
war.
The role of interpretation is critical to our inquiry. Whatever the
theoretical scope of the U.S. President's power to wage war, the President's
own interpretation of his authority to use force-or more accurately, the
interpretation of the lawyers and policy makers working on these matters
within the executive branch-is often determinative of executive war powers in
practice. In today's non-traditional conflict with al Qaeda and now, to an
increasing degree, ISIS, the potential for novel interpretation is enormous. To
this very day, debate continues both inside and outside the executive branch
over the appropriate scope of the President's war powers in this conflict, from
those who would have the President receive absolute deference to those who
demand that the President return to Congress for any extension of the conflict
beyond those core forces behind the 9/11 attacks. 8 And executive branch
lawyers through two administrations have struggled to apply the laws
developed for traditional state-to-state wars to this novel and evolving conflict
with a non-state terrorist organization. There are few simple answers, and
despite an unprecedented amount of public discourse in recent years over the
Executive's wartime actions and legal positions, much remains undertheorized,
secret, or both.
As a practical matter, the Executive's current ambiguity over its cobelligerency theory is likely home in part out of the political tension between
seeking to cabin the war, on the one hand, and providing sufficient flexibility to
the Executive to meet an evolving threat without having to continuously face
off against a hostile Congress, on the other. But whatever the reason for the
Executive's opacity, as things stand today, the public can only discover that we
are at war with a particular group not because Congress declares it, not because
the Executive declares it, not even because the group attacks us,9 but rather
because we attack them.10
Reliance on co-belligerency to understand the scope of the AUMF has
evolved in the course of the conflict with al Qaeda and new groups as they have
8.
See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal & Steve 1. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 4 HARv. NAT'L SECURITY
J. 115, 119 (2014) (arguing that statutory use-of-force authorizations be "carefully calibrated to the
specific threat posed by an identifiable group, and limited in scope and duration"); Robert J. Delahunty
& John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against
Terrorist Organizationsand the Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
487 (2001) (arguing that the President has broad constitutional authority to determine when to use
military force); Michael Ramsey, Must CongressApprove Attacks on IS in Libya?, ORIGINALISM BLOG

(Aug. 3, 2016, 6:37 AM), http://otiginalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2016/08/mustcongress-approve-attacks-on-is-in-libyamichael-ramsey.html
(arguing that in a defensive context,
"[o]nce the war begins, the President may fight it, in the ways the President thinks best").
9.
As I explain in Part I, it is not clear to what extent the Executive's current test for a
group's entry into the conflict, and thus categorization as an "associated force" covered by the AUMF,
relies upon a direct initiation of active violence or hostilities by that group.
10.
Even then, the public learns this information only if the Executive discloses it or confirms
it when uncovered by a third party. And we can infer from such an action only that the Executive has
determined it has authority to attack a particular actor. We still cannot be sure of the legal theory for the
Executive's use of force unless the Executive discloses that information. For example, as the discussion
of al-Shabaab, infra, demonstrates, a U.S. strike does not always reveal a determination that the entire
group is an "associated force" engaged in an armed conflict with the United States.
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gained prominence. This interpretive device will increasingly determine the
course of today's conflict with ISIS, and perhaps even tomorrow's conflict with
an entity as yet unknown to us. The Administration's claim in extending its
AUMF authority to ISIS itself does not rest on co-belligerency, but the concept
is equally applicable to the ISIS conflict. Executive officials claim that ISIS is a
direct successor or splinter of al Qaeda, and, as such, the AUMF applies
equally to the use of force against it just as it would if al Qaeda had simply
changed its name.II The logic of that rationale suggests that legally, ISIS stands
in al Qaeda's shoes, and all of the Executive's claimed AUMF authorities
against al Qaeda should apply equally to ISIS. If the AUMF provides the
President with the power to fight co-belligerents of al Qaeda (however "cobelligerent" might ultimately be defined), then it authorizes the President to
fight co-belligerents of ISIS. And so too will it authorize the President to fight
co-belligerents of any group the Executive deems a successor to al Qaeda or
ISIS going forward, until the courts or Congress intervene to oppose or clarify
this interpretation.
To be sure, the President does not claim unbounded authority. Executive
branch officials have taken care to justify their legal position by reference to
what they say are existing rules that both justify and limit their actions. This is
an effective approach. In fact, it is through binding itself to a professed legal
constraint that the Executive has at times managed to retain for itself significant
flexibility.12 As I have argued elsewhere, the Executive has throughout history
softened its claims to enhanced domestic power by calling on limiting
principles drawn from international law; yet these international law limiting
principles do not always provide the clear constraints the Executive's
invocation suggests.1 3 The concerns I will address in this Article lie not,
therefore, in the Executive's lack of a professed legal position. The problem is
that the professed legal position-while generally accepted in principle at a
superficial level by the courts and Congress-rests on an underlying theory that
is at best poorly understood and at worst, a m6lange of competing theories that
executive officials have never been pressed to finally and firmly crystalize in
one clear position.
This Article will proceed in four Parts. Part I lays the doctrinal foundation
for our inquiry. It sifts through the public debris of executive branch decisionmaking to excavate the actual contours of the Executive's understanding of its
statutory war powers. This excavation is itself no simple task. Much of
executive branch national security lawyering occurs by necessity in secret. The
information available to us is limited, and yet there are pockets of data that we
can curate and then assemble to construct a more comprehensive understanding
of the government's evolving position. Specifically, this Part draws on
I1.

See Preston Speech, supra note 2.

12. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11 (2012) (arguing that the existence of checks on presidential power legitimize presidential
actions); Rebecca Ingber, InternationalLaw Constraints as Executive Power, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49,
61 (2016) (arguing that the executive branch has at times invoked constraints on the state imposed by
international law "as a means of softening its claim to enhanced domestic power").
See Ingber, supra note 12, at 49.
13.
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statements by executive branch officials in speeches, congressional testimony,
legal briefs, press briefings, letters to and from Congress (some uncovered
through FOIA requests), executive branch reports, state practice, and even
press reports of internal executive branch deliberation. This Part will
demonstrate that the Executive's legal theory for interpreting the AUMF is not
one clear test, but rather the ambiguous-and I'll argue largely unintentionalresult of an internally evolving, and internally contested, spectrum of legal
theories.
The daylight between the Executive's professed adherence to a strict
limiting principle, on the one hand, and the reality of this internal tension and
resulting operational ambiguity, on the other, suggests that the co-belligerency
theory operates dangerously close to what David Dyzenhaus has termed a
"legal grey hole." 14 As Dyzenhaus describes it, a grey hole is a "disguised
black hole[]," a "fagade .

.

. of the rule of law," in which legal hurdles serve to

legitimize the government's positions while merely rubber stamping the
government's actions." Here it is not merely that the Executive has failed to
explain its co-belligerency theory beyond a simple pronouncement; it is that
there very likely is not one clearly crystalized operating legal theory at all. Yet
because all evidence suggests that the government has intended even this messy
standard to operate as some constraint, and, moreover, that executive officials
have truly felt themselves hindered in some way by attempts to adhere to that
standard, I will modify Dyzenhaus's term for this purpose, and suggest that the
space in which the Executive's co-belligerency theory operates might be more
accurately called grey-ish.
Part II traces the ambiguity in the co-belligerency approach to a tension
between two potential theories for extending the Executive's AUJMF authority
beyond core al Qaeda. One theory, which I term here the "Support Test," can
be traced to the middle of the Bush Administration, at a time when executive
branch lawyers were first seeking to tie the President's war powers claims more
explicitly to statutory authority. The concept makes its first public appearance
in a few lines in a 2005 HarvardLaw Review Article by Jack Goldsmith and
Curtis Bradley. 16 There the authors derive the concept by analogizing to the
historic international law of neutrality, arguing that a group becomes a "cobelligerent" of al Qaeda through the substantial provision of support for the
group, similar to the level of support that historically would have made a
neutral state a legitimate target by one of the state parties to a traditional armed
conflict. This theory remains the most publicly elaborated of the Executive's
approaches, but it rests on flawed doctrinal grounds, both in its application of
14.

DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY

3, 42, 50 (2006) ("[A] grey hole is a space in which the detainee has some procedural rights but not

sufficient for him effectively to contest the executive's case for his detention. It is in substance a legal
black hole but worse because the procedural tights available to the detainee cloak the lack of
substance."); see also Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REv. 1566
(2016) (identifying as "rule of law tropes" areas where the executive branch professes adherence to a
recognized legal standard, but in fact secretly operates under a modification of that standard).
15.

DYZENHAUS, supra note 14, at 3.

16.
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047 (2005).
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largely obsolete neutrality law principles designed for states to a modem
conflict with a non-state terrorist group, and in its overstating of the
consequences of a neutrality breach under that historic body of law. At best, the
Bradley and Goldsmith theory might shed light on the parties against whom
Congress could have declared war in accordance with international law, not on
the parties against whom Congress actually did declare war. Neutrality law is
thus not an adequate source for determining the scope of the President's
domestic AUMF authority.
A second theory, which I term the "Active Hostilities Test," represents an
effort by some within the Obama Administration to further constrain the war's
scope. It may also represent an effort, though this has never been made explicit,
to tie the Executive's approach to an entirely different international law
standard. That standard, which stems from the 1990s jurisprudence of an
international criminal tribunal, has the benefit of having been fairly wellestablished at the time of the 2001 AUMF, but is not without its own problems,
in particular that it may be too constraining for the particular question at hand.
Part II dissects both tests and their likely sources and analyzes their policy
implications, benefits and concerns, as well as their likely champions within the
Executive.
At this point, I will have demonstrated that despite the Executive's claim
to a strictly cabined and transparent statutory war powers theory guided by a
"well-established" principle of international law, the Executive's cobelligerency theory is instead secret, malleable, shifting, and, to the extent it
rests on any external legal foundation, it is a flawed one. Yet despite these
problems, the Executive has successfully relied upon the concept of cobelligerency to entrench in both the courts and Congress the general principle
that it should read its statutory authority broadly, even to cover groups which
may not have existed at the time of the statute's enactment. Moreover, this
broad reading of statutory wartime authorities has now survived two very
different presidential administrations from ideologically opposing ends of the
war powers spectrum;" it will likely continue to serve as the legal framework
for this evolving conflict well into at least the next administration. Further still,
considering the fondness of executive branch officials for executive precedent
in the President's favor, we can readily envision that reliance on cobelligerency in interpreting the President's statutory war powers will survive

There is debate over the extent of this ideological divide. Some scholars now view the
17.
practice of the Obama Administration on war powers and executive unilateralism as more one of
convergence with than divergence from the Bush Administration. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY

AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT (2014); Jack Goldsmith, Obama Has Officially Adopted Bush's Iraq
Doctrine, TIME (Apr. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4283865/obama-adopted-bushs-iraq-doctrine/. But see
Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAlarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688 (2011) (reviewing ACKERMAN,
supra); Marty Lederman, The Egan Speech and the Bush Doctrine: Imminence, Necessity, and "First
Use" in the Jus ad Bellum, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 11, 2016, 8:47 AM), https'//www.justsecurity.org
/30522/egan-speech-bush-doctrine-imminence-necessity-first-use-jus-ad-bellum/.
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this conflict and will form the baseline for interpreting future congressional
grants of wartime authority.'1
Nevertheless, this is not a story of a simple power grab. The cobelligerency story is a useful case study through which to explore the messy
reality of executive branch legal positioning and, at times, unintentional
accretion of executive power. Part III will examine the counter-intuitive origins
and evolution of this theory, and how we got to where we are today.
Finally, Part IV addresses the implications of this case study for executive
power and the efficacy of legal constraint on the President. This cobelligerency case study reveals more than a doctrinal flaw in a war powers
theory or an aggressive executive assertion of power during war. Rather, it
brings to light the underexplored manner in which a creative executive
interpretation evolves into a greyish legal space. Through the lens of this cobelligerency case study, this Article explores the roles that legal interpretation,
misunderstanding, transparency and secrecy, substantive legal expertise in both
international and domestic law, as well as internal executive disagreement and
the institutional design of legal decision-making within the Executive, all play
in determining the real dynamics of presidential power.
I.

Co-BELLIGERENCY AND WAR POWERS TODAY

Technically, the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to declare
war. But since the Second World War, the formal practice of declaring war has
gone the way of the carrier pigeon, and the precise contours of the President's
constitutional authorities to defend the state and engage in action short of actual
"war" unilaterally are heavily debated. It is uncontroversial, however, that the
President's powers are at their greatest when he acts in accordance with
congressional authorization.1 9 Thus, rather than press the outer bounds of
constitutional power, and for reasons sounding in politics and policy as well as
in law, presidents have tended to seek statutory authorizations to use force
when engaging in conflicts of any magnitude, particularly those involving
large-scale use of ground troops. 20
18.
See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011) (relying on
prior Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memoranda to assert unilateral executive power); Trevor W.
Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Ofjice of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1448 (2010). For a rare
counterexample, see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 151-62 (2007), recounting his overturning, as the head of OLC, of what became
known as the "torture memos," the legal memoranda from his predecessor's tenure authorizing
maltreatment of wartime detainees.
19.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.").
20.
Presidents have also historically acted "in accordance with" the War Powers Resolution,
which requires congressional authorization for engagement in hostilities beyond sixty days, though most
have not recognized its requirements as constitutionally mandated or even constitutionally permissible.
See, e.g., Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House
of Representatives (Dec. I1, 2015) (2015 WL 8488906) ("providing this.. . report, consistent with the
War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed . . .")
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Letter From The President: War Powers Resolution]. The Carter
Administration is a possible exception. See A Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War
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There is much at stake in this allocation of authority between the
President and Congress over the choice to go to war or enter hostilities. Yet
despite the large stakes, or perhaps because of them, there is no clear arbiter.
Courts are generally loath to interfere in presidents' decisions to use military
force against an external actor. 21 Congress, for its part, has rarely if ever
22
engaged its full capacities to interfere with presidential warmaking, though
this may be due in part to the fact that presidents have historically made efforts
to justify their actions and explain the grounds for their authority.23
When feasible, presidents have thus typically justified their wartime
24
actions by attempting to tie them to some statutory authority. And because of
the lack of external intervention, executive interpretationof the President's
authority to use force under congressional authorization is often the whole
ballgame. In recent years, this executive understanding of the scope of the
President's authority to wage war has turned largely on an aggressive
interpretation of the AUMF, which executive officials justify through the
concept of co-belligerency.
In order to dissect that theory, it is necessary first to survey the domestic
law surrounding the President's use of force against al Qaeda, ISIS, and
associates.
A. Statutory War Powers Today
1.

The Authorizationfor Use ofMilitary Force

The President today rests his domestic wartime authority in the ongoing
conflict with al Qaeda and ISIS primarily on the 2001 AUMF. To the extent
Powers Resolution: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 188-190 (1977)
(statement of Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State) (expressing the "administration's
support" for the act). In Kosovo, the NATO campaign went eighteen days past the sixty-day clock, and
thus technically should have required congressional approval. In Libya, Obama administration officials
argued that the U.S. participation in the NATO campaign after the sixty-day mark did not amount to
"hostilities" under the act. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State).
This is true even when the target in question is an American citizen. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi
21.

v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (dismissing case for lack of standing and on
political question grounds).
22.
Congress has a range of options at its disposal for reining in executive overreach,
including control over defense appropriations.
Another reason is that the same collective-action problems that may prevent Congress
23.
from enacting a wartime authorization may also hinder legislative attempts to thwart executive action.
Harold Koh calls this phenomenon "Find the Statute." See Harold Hongju Koh, War and
24.
Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 14 (1995). Even early Bush
Administration positions that are recalled as claims to expansive unilateral executive power often relied
on a combination of constitutional and statutory authority. See, e.g., Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (relying on the
"authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the [AUMF]"); Brief

for the Respondents, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) [hereinafter Hamdi Brief]
(relying on both Article H and AUMF authority for detention). Others, of course, did not. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William
J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003) ("Any effort by Congress to regulate the
interrogation of enemy combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-inChief authority in the President.").
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that the President acts outside that statutory authority, he has some limited
recourse to use force in accordance with the War Powers Resolution, 25 but
beyond that he must assert some independent constitutional authority in order
to act. An immediate response in self-defense to an attack would surely satisfy
that requirement. But for an ongoing engagement in a conflict that has no end
in sight, the President is on surer footing relying on statutory authority.
Executive officials have therefore taken great pains-certainly in recent
years-to assert that the President's actions in this conflict come fully within
his statutory authority under the AUTMF. 26
The AUTF does not explicitly name its targets, crafted as it was in the
tumultuous days just after 9/11. Instead, it authorizes the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he

determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of intemational terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or

persons. 27

The "organizations" in the AUMF are widely understood to represent al
Qaeda and the Taliban. There is no mention of al Qaeda associates, or of new
groups who might join the fray. In fact, in the days preceding the AUMF's
enactment, executive officials had requested open-ended authority to use force
to deter terrorism more broadly, but Congress limited the text to this language,
tying the President's authority directly to the 9/11 attackers themselves.28
Nevertheless, since the early years after its enactment, the executive
branch has-through two ideologically opposed administrations-interpreted
this statutory authority to reach not only al Qaeda and Taliban forces, but also
other groups that fight alongside or provide significant support to those forces.
The Executive has at various points termed these groups "affiliates" or
"associated forces" of al Qaeda. The Executive's explanation for this
interpretation has shifted-in the early years arguing that such groups fall
within the term "organization" itself2 9-but ultimately the Executive has settled
on an argument that congressional grants of wartime authority should be
understood to include groups that join the conflict. As justification, the
Executive asserts that this interpretation is "based on the well-established
25.
War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (requiring that the
President get congressional approval for hostilities lasting more than 60/90 days). Presidents have
inconsistently embraced the War Powers Resolution. Nixon tried to veto it, but more generally,
Presidents have acted "consistently" with its requirements: neither conceding nor challenging its
constitutionality. See supra note 20.
26.
See, e.g., Hamdi Brief, supra note 24; Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., Address
Before Yale Law School: National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration
(Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Jeh Johnson Speech]; Preston Speech, supra note 2.
27.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
28.
See David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and
Political Considerationsin Authorizing Use of ForceAgainst InternationalTerrorism, 43 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 71, 73 (2002).
29.
See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 061397) [hereinafter Parhat Brief] (quoting Organization, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004))

(pointing to the reference to "organizations" in the AUMF, and arguing that "a group that joins forces
with al Qaida or the Taliban becomes part of those covered 'organizations.' This result follows naturally
from the plain meaning of the term 'organization,' which is a 'body of persons formed for a common
purpose.').

Co-Belligerency

2017]

77

concept of co-belligerency in the laws of war," and is thus grounded in legal
principles and precedent.3 0 In other words, the President's domestic statutory
authority turns on executive branch interpretation of whom internationallaw
would construe as our enemies in the conflict with al Qaeda.
The thrust of the Executive's argument is that, in enacting this use of
force statute, Congress must have intended this authority to apply not only to al
Qaeda and Taliban forces, but also to all groups that join the fight against the
United States alongside these forces. We can call those groups "associated
forces" of al Qaeda, or al Qaeda's "co-belligerents," a term that has loosely
31
identified states fighting on the same side of an armed conflict. While the

Executive points to the international laws of war as justification for its cobelligerency theory, the purpose here is very much a domestic one: the
interpretation of a domestic statute granting authority to the President to use
force.
2.

The AUMF and ISIS

The Executive's legal theory for ISIS is distinct from its co-belligerency
analysis and merits a brief detour here, because ISIS itself will soon be
enmeshed in the co-belligerency story. The Executive's position on ISIS is that
32
it essentially is or was al Qaeda and split off from the group. That claim itself
is highly fact-dependent and the government has not to date provided a
standard for how it determined-or would in the future determine-that a new
group was sufficiently connected to al Qaeda to be considered a successor to
that group, beyond the conclusory language it has employed in declaring ISIS
to be one.3 3 Whether or not the government's succession position is a factually
fair read of that relationship, the extension of the AUMF to ISIS does not itself
hinge on co-belligerency. 34 But co-belligerency is nevertheless highly relevant
to the ISIS conflict for the simple reason that under the Executive's theory,
ISIS legally stands in al Qaeda's shoes. Any legal theory regarding cobelligerents of al Qaeda applies equally to co-belligerents of ISIS. Like al

The Framework Under U.S. Law for Current Military Operations:Hearing Before the S.
30.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel,

Dep't of Def.).
Under the executive branch's recent explications of its AUMF authority, co-belligerents
31.
and associated forces are often used as interchangeable terms, but "co-belligerency" is also included as
one piece of a two-part test defining associated forces. This could either be a drafting error, or could
suggest that the term co-belligerent is intended as a subset of "associated forces," and that the Executive
may have a more stringent test for identifying "associated forces." The reality of executive branch
decision-making discussed in this Article suggests that both theories may in fact coexist within the
executive branch.
Preston Speech, supra note 2.
32.
The factual question of whether ISIS is or is not truly a splinter offshoot of al Qaeda is
33.
debatable and beyond the scope of this Article.
As this Article went to print, new press reports stated that the Obama administration was
34.
about to disclose to Congress that it was now extending the AUMF to al Qaeda, which, if true, would
suggest that the Administration had decided to deem al Shabab an associated force. Charlie Savage, Eric
Schmitt, & Mark Mazzetti, Obama Expands War With Al Qaeda To Include Shabab in Somalia,
N.Y.TIMEs (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/us/politics/obama-expands-war-withal-qaeda-to-include-shabab-in-somalia.html?smprod-nytcore-iphone&smid-nytcore-iphone-share.
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Qaeda, ISIS is connected to a web of terrorist groups with varying allegiances
and goals, perhaps even more so.3' The group's interest in promoting remote
acts of terror and "preauthorizing" lone wolf attacks further complicates the
analysis. 36 Before long, if it has not already, the Executive will certainly face
questions regarding the applicability of the AUMF to groups that either join or
support ISIS, just as it has faced with al Qaeda.3 1
3. InternationalLaw and Domestic Interpretation
It is worth taking a moment to consider the role of international law in
informing the AUMF. The question before us, as I noted above, is a domestic
one: how to interpret which groups fall within the scope of the President's
statutory AUMF authority. Scholars have suggested a variety of approaches to
answer this. Some advocate a strict interpretation that would only include those
persons and organizations explicitly named and no individuals who joined the
conflict after 9/11, while others advocate reading flexibility in the term
"organizations," looking perhaps to domestic criminal law to consider how to
understand membership in al Qaeda sufficient to bring new members into the
AUMF orbit. Some have argued that the President should simply get complete
deference to decide who falls within the statute. 38
For its part, the Executive's approach has fairly consistently been to look
to international law to provide content to the terms of the statute. 39 The
invocation of international law to understand potentially ambiguous statutory
authority is not itself unusual. In fact, under the longstanding Charming Betsy
canon of domestic statutory interpretation, courts faced with ambiguous statutes
must credit the interpretation that would not violate international law. 0
Interpreting the AUMIF in light of the Charming Betsy canon would entail
construing the President's authority to use force under the AUMF as limited by
international law prohibitions on the use of force or conduct of hostilities. For
example, this would mean reading the AUMIF to require the President to follow
the international law jus in bello principle of distinction, which prohibits the
direct targeting of civilians who are not directly participating in hostilities.

35.
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Associated Forces: Why the Diferences Between ISIL and alQaeda Matter, JUST SECUlUTY (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:57 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/21621/forcesdifferences-isil-al-qaeda-matter/.

36.

Id.

37.
See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, U.S. Scrambles To Contain Growing ISIS Threat in Libya, N.Y.
TrfEs (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/world/africa/us-scrambles-to-containgrowing-isis-threat-in-libya.html (citing concerns by intelligence officials of "emerging evidence that
the Islamic State had turned to its affiliate in Nigeria-the Islamic militant organization called Boko
Haram . . to poach young commanders and fighters from al Qaeda's affiliate in northwest Africa and
from its Shabab franchise in Somalia").
38.
See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8.
39.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Respondents Regarding the Government's Detention
Authority Relative to the Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee

Litigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-mc-0442) [hereinafter March 13 Brief]; Hamdi
Brief, supra note 24; Preston Speech, supra note 2.

40.

Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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This Charming Betsy canon, however, which operates to promote
international law compliance, is not the interpretative mechanism at issue in the
co-belligerency context. Under the Executive's co-belligerency theory, the
Executive reads the AUMF expansively, not narrowly, to authorize force
against groups not clearly contemplated by the domestic statute, on the grounds
that international law itself permits such force, not that a different reading
would somehow violate international law. An expansive reading of the AUMF
is hardly necessary for international law compliance. In a prior work I have
41
referred to this power-enhancing interpretive mechanism as a Reverse Betsy.
Relying on international law to enhance domestic power has less clear
precedent than the CharmingBetsy canon of constraining interpretation, but it
is not novel.42 Executive officials and scholars have long turned to international
law to understand domestic grants of both constitutional and statutory wartime
authority to the President, such as the contours of the commander-in-chief
clause, or a declaration of war, and the extent to which that interplay serves as
43
constraining or expanding depends on one's baseline.
I have in prior work discussed potential dangers inherent in the
Executive's invocation of international law to aggressively interpret its
domestic powers, including that it enables a significant delegation of discretion
to the President to interpret his own domestic authority." But as a matter of
practical reality, this component of the Executive's approach-that the AUMF
should not only be understood as constrained by but also read expansively in
light of international law-is fairly well-settled as a matter both of judicial
precedent and congressional acquiescence. 4 5 Even more specifically, both the
courts and Congress have accepted the Executive's assertion that the AUMF
should be interpreted to extend to "associated forces" under a concept called
"co-belligerency," which the Executive has assured them is a "well46
established" principle derived from the international laws of war.

41.

See Ingber, supra note 12, at 62.

42.

Id.

43.

See, e.g., David Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution: A

Franckian-MadisonianApproach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 363, 364, 379-80 (2003); Ingrid B.
Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause

Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 63-64, 73-97 (2007); see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
&

635 (1863) (relying on international law to understand the President's wartime authority); Bradley
Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 2091 (arguing that it is likely "Congress intended to authorize the President
to take at least those actions permitted by the laws of war" and arguing that this is supported by
precedent and executive practice).
44.
See Ingber, supra note 12.
45.
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125

Stat. 1298 (2011); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (reading the AUMF implicitly to
authorize detention in light of international law's acceptance of-and limitations on-detention of
enemy fighters during "active hostilities").

46.

Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009); 2013 SASC Hearing, supra note I

(generally questioning executive officials on the concept of associated forces, but accepting the
invocation of international law to expand the President's authority under the AUMF); Jeh Johnson
Speech, supra note 26; Preston Speech, supra note 2.
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Divining The Executive's Co-Belligerency Theory

Considering the significant work it does in enhancing the scope of the
President's AUMF authority, it is critical to understand precisely what this
"well-established concept of co-belligerency" actually is. And it is perhaps
even more important to understand what the Executive intends by it, and how it
informs the Executive's interpretation of the President's statutory war powers.
After all, what the Executive means by "co-belligerency" in this conflict with al
Qaeda and ISIS determines the bounds of whom the Executive may lawfully
detain, target, and kill.
Taking as given the Executive's stated justification for an expansive
reading of the 2001 AUMF-that it must include within its ambit groups that
become parties to the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda-the key
question becomes: who are these other existing parties to the conflict? "Cobelligerents" might be the right term to apply to such groups once we identify
them, but what is our standard for determining who these groups are? What
exactly does "co-belligerents" mean? Does it include only those who have
sworn allegiance to al Qaeda, or can the President lawfully target other groups?
Does it matter whether those groups have engaged in "active hostilities," or can
the President also target with legal force groups who "supported" al Qaeda in
its conflict? The scope of a fifteen-year conflict turns on the question, but
surprisingly, the executive branch does not have a clear answer.
Considering the Executive's oft-stated reliance on "co-belligerency" as a
limiting principle for its expansive AUMF interpretation, one might expect that
this is a concept one could find defined in a treatise of either domestic or
international law, and that this definition would provide clear content for
determining when a non-state armed group becomes a party to a pre-existing
armed conflict. But that is not the case. "Co-belligerent" is simply a fairly
informal term of identification. It is a label for entities, historically states-and
in particular belligerent states-that have joined an armed conflict on the side
of one of the parties.4 7 It is similar in meaning to "ally," though it lacks any
requirement for the formal ties that label suggests. The label "co-belligerent"
has been used historically, though without great frequency. The term makes a
rare appearance in treaty language,4 8 and some U.S. statutes, 49 as a means of
identifying states that are parties on the same side of an armed conflict. And it
is used today as a label for states that are partners in an armed conflict,
including states that have joined the United States in its conflict with al
Qaeda.50 But there is little to no international law content elaborating further on
47.
See, e.g., MORRis GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW of LAND WARFARE 531 (1959)
(defining co-belligerent as "a fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with one or more
belligerent powers").
48.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (distinguishing, along with nationals of neutral states, "nationals
of a co-belligerent state" to the detaining power as individuals who do not qualify as protected persons
under the Convention, so long as "the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic
representation in the State in whose hands they are").

49.
50.

See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950(t) (2009).
See id.
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the meaning of the term "co-belligerent" or on what precise conglomeration of
activities would suffice to make an entity a "co-belligerent." In short, the term
itself does no work in explaining when a non-state armed group becomes a
party to the armed conflict. Instead we must look to other sources in
international law in order to consider how to determine when an entity's actions
render it a belligerent party to an armed conflict.
Since the use of the term itself does not provide this content, attempts to
glean the Executive's understanding of what it intends by "co-belligerent"
today require a degree of investigative work, to sift through and curate the trail
of evidence the Executive leaves in its wake. This trail includes statements by
executive branch officials in speeches, congressional testimony, legal briefs,
letters to and from Congress, press briefings, executive branch reports, state
practice, and even press reports of internal executive branch disputes. Divining
the executive branch interpretation here also requires an analysis of the recent
history and context that provide the backdrop against which the Executive now
operates.
Let's begin our story at the end, or at least, today (which, when all is said
and done in this conflict, will probably look more like the middle if not the
beginning). Today the Obama executive branch interprets the AUMF to extend
to associated forces through a theory it publicly laid out about halfway into the
Administration.5 1 This theory has two prongs: an associated force must be "(1)
an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and
(2) [] a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners." When the Administration announced this approach, it was
(and remains) the most detailed explanation that executive officials had
provided to date. On its face it seems to provide clear lines for determining
which groups might fall within the "associated forces" theory. Yet upon closer
examination and when read in conjunction with other pieces of data from the
Executive trail, it becomes clear that there is much interpretive work happening
behind the terms "entered the fight" and "co-belligerent" that is not
immediately apparent on the surface, and which may affect the meaning of the
Executive's theory dramatically.
Indeed, while the language of the Executive's theory-and specifically,
phrases like "entered the fight," or "hostilities against the United States"might suggest a threshold requirement of direct participation in hostilities
against the United States before a group may be deemed covered, other
evidence suggests that it may be employing a lower threshold.5 2 These sources,
53
and the limited information we can gather from its practice, suggest that the

51.
Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26. This Article went to publication in December 2016,
before the end of the Obama Administration.

52.

See id.

We cannot know the entire set of groups the Executive today determines as falling within
53.
the associated forces umbrella. But the Executive has at various points publicly named certain groups as
"associated forces" of al Qaeda. Under the Bush Administration, the Executive argued in briefing in the
Guantanamo litigation that that East Turkestan Islamic Movement ("ETIM") and Lashkar-e-Taiba
("LET") were associated forces. See Parhat Brief, supra note 29; Respondents' Memorandum to
Petitioners' Motions for Expedited Judgment on the Record, Boston v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 80
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Executive may accept some level of support to al Qaeda, and thus as to ISIS as
well, as sufficient to render a group a co-belligerent. 54
Likewise, it is not clear whether "co-belligerent" is coterminous with
"associated force" or if it is a subset of the latter term, as suggested by this twoprong approach in which it appears part of the definition in the second prong.
The USG often uses the terms "associated forces" and "co-belligerents of al
Qaeda" interchangeably, which suggests that the term "co-belligerent" and the
standard the Executive imparts to it may be doing most of the work.55 Either
way, the Executive's stated associated forces theory does not provide the
information necessary to assess the standard under which the Executive
internally determines the groups that fall within the AUIF. But we can piece
together additional information about this standard from executive statements
in briefs, speeches, and other documents, and from the sources the Executive
has relied upon in the few instances it has litigated this question.
With respect to executive branch practice, the Executive has not regularly
provided a public accounting of the groups it deems covered under the
President's AUMF authority as "associated forces" in this conflict. But there
have been some occasions when it has released information that is relevant to
our inquiry. First, in a speech in 2015, the DOD General Counsel Stephen
Preston announced the entire set of groups that the Administration at that time
considered to fall within AUMF authority. 56 There is some ambiguous wording
in the list; in particular it is not clear whether Preston intended to include all of
al Nusra under the associated force umbrella or only certain individuals within
the group with particular ties to al Qaeda.5 7 A decision to include the entire
group would suggest that the Executive was asserting authority to target groups
that did not necessarily first participate in active attacks against the United
States. Similarly, we know from media reports that the Executive has had

(D.D.C. 2011) (No. 05-CV-883). Recently, in the spring of 2015, Stephen Preston listed the entire set of
groups that the Administration at that time considered to fall within AUMF authority, which included, in
addition to al Qaeda and the Taliban: insurgent groups in Afghanistan; al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), in Yemen; the Khorasan Group in Syria; and ISIL. See Preston Speech, supra note

2.
54.
This accords with a phenomenon that is evident on the micro level as well: the
Executive's reliance on support, in addition to direct or active participation in hostilities, to determine
individual combatancy. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
55.
See, e.g., Government's Memorandum of Law in Support of Final Judgment Denying a
Permanent Injunction and Dismissing This Action, Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y.

2012) (No. 12-3176).
56.
This list from Spring 2015 is as follows: al Qaeda and the Taliban; "other terrorist or
insurgent groups in Afghanistan"; individuals who are part of al Qaeda in Somalia and Libya; al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen; "Nusrah Front and, specifically, those members of al
Qa'ida referred to as the Khorasan Group in Syria"; and ISIL. See Preston Speech, supra note 2.
57.
Id. Since that speech, executive officials have made similarly ambiguous statements with
respect to al Nusra, which suggest that the group's status is not definitively resolved inside the executive

branch. See, e.g., Peter Cook, Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room, U.S. DEP'T
DEFENSE (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article
/7131 7 4/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-in
(drawing a
line between targeting an al-Nusra member who was also a member of al Qaeda, on the one hand, and
targeting al Nusra as a group, on the other, but later stating, inexplicably, "[i]n this instance, we're
talking about a historic-Al Qaida members who may be affiliated with al-Nusra. Now, al-Nusra has
been an affiliate of Al Qaida, so it's in very much-one in [sic] the same").
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longstanding internal debates about the status of groups that are somewhat
more attenuated from the direct conflict with the United States: in particular
groups like al-Shabaab, whose leaders might have ties with al Qaeda but whose
58
foot soldiers may be more focused on a particular regional struggle. These
pieces of evidence suggest that the Executive's theory does not contain a hard
and fast rule that a group must first directly attack the United States before
coming within the orbit of the Executive's associated forces theory. These data
points are useful for trying to glean the parameters of the Executive's asserted
authority-at least for these particular points in time-but do not provide
sufficient content to establish an underlying legal theory or understand how that
theory would apply in specific cases going forward.
For this we must look elsewhere. The most specific publicly available
content for the theoretical background for this theory comes from legal briefs
the U.S. Government has filed in the context of the Guantanamo habeas
litigation. These briefs suggest the Executive has looked, at least in part, to
concepts drawn from neutrality law in understanding its modem cobelligerency approach. Some of these briefs directly reference neutrality law as
a background source for the Executive's theory; more often they cite sources
that themselves rely on neutrality law. 59 Taken together, these briefs and the
Executive's known practice suggest that origins of the Executive's cobelligerency approach trace to a theory-or a modified form of a theory 6 -that
Jack Goldsmith and Curt Bradley publicly debuted in their seminal piece on the
AUMF in the HarvardLaw Review in 2005.61 This Article is one of the few
sources cited when the government raises the matter in briefs, and it is the only
source cited that justifies the use of the co-belligerency concept to interpret the
62
reach of the AUMF.

I will return to a thorough discussion of the Bradley/Goldsmith theory in
Part I, in which I attempt to excavate the origin story of the Executive's cobelligerency theory. But for the purposes of this Section it is critical to know
the following: first, the Bradley/Goldsmith test proposes that an armed group
can become a co-belligerent of al Qaeda, and thus fall within the President's
58.
See, e.g., JAMES R. CLAPPER, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR
THE RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 4 (2013)

(calling al-Shabaab an "al-Qa'ida-affiliated insurgency" but stating that al-Shabaab "will remain focused
on local and regional challenges"); CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11
PRESIDENCY 274-79 (2015) (reporting on ongoing internal debates between executive branch legal
advisers over whether to brand al-Shabaab an associated force of al Qaeda); Letter From The President
to Congress (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/11/war-powersresolution (noting a U.S. strike against "an al-Shabaab senior leader who is part of al-Qa'ida"). For
additional discussion on nuances in the Executive's legal theory on al-Shabaab, see infra note 75 and
accompanying text.

59.

See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 31, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(No. 09-5051) [hereinafter Al-Bihani Briefj ("The international law concepts of neutrality and cobelligerency . .. confirm that the 'enemy' in an armed conflict can include the enemy's affiliates.")

(emphasis added).
60.
See Sinnar, supra note 14 (arguing that the Executive often creates secret modifications to
terms of art it employs, despite the public's assumption of the terms' meaning under standard usage).
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43.
61.

62.

See, e.g., Al-Bihani Brief, supra note 59, at 31 (citing Bradley and Goldsmith for its

reliance on neutrality law and co-belligerency in informing the AUMF); Parhat Brief, supra note 29.
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AUMF authority, by providing "systematic or significant" support to al Qaeda.
Second, Goldsmith and Bradley point to the historic body of international law
known as neutrality law for support for this theory, analogizing from the
repercussions that flow from a state violating its neutrality to how we should
treat a non-state armed group that provides a similar level of wartime support to
a group like al Qaeda. The third point is less relevant for understanding the
Executive's theory but leaving it until later would too significantly risk burying
the lede, so I note it here only briefly: I argue that there is a small flaw in the
Bradley/Goldsmith description of the relationship between neutrality law
violations and the implications for co-belligerent status, and that this has
significant repercussions for the domestic law purpose for which it is used
today.63 in essence, I argue that the neutrality-based test does not define the
parties to the conflict as a matter of either international or domestic law.
Therefore, this international law-derived test does not fit the domestic law
purpose.
The Obama Administration has not exactly embraced the
Bradley/Goldsmith test with consistency. Aside from citing the article in some
early briefs, executive officials have not generally referenced the test when
discussing the associated forces or "co-belligerency" theory. This may be due
to a combination of factors I will dissect further in Part II, including political
reasons, such as the fact that both Goldsmith and Bradley had served under the
prior Administration. But Executive distancing from this particular source may
also be substantive, and may evince an intent to move away from the specific
neutrality-law based theory espoused within the Bradley/Goldsmith law review
article. This distancing, combined with the Executive's production of a new
two-pronged approach that includes an "entered the fight" criterion, suggests
that the Executive's position has either evolved some distance from the
Bradley/Goldsmith theory of 2005, or that the Executive has taken great pains
to suggest that its position has evolved from that period.
Taken together, we have the following data points on how the Executive
interprets the scope of its AUMF authority: 1) the appearance of a strict
approach, announced in speeches, which requires that a group must have
"entered the fight" and must be a "co-belligerent of al Qaeda"; 2) some residual
reliance in litigation on a theory first espoused by Goldsmith and Bradley,
which suggests a neutrality law-derived, support-based test for associated
forces; 3) ambiguous wording in executive speeches and press statements that
suggests the Executive may be targeting groups that have provided support but
have not necessarily first engaged in attacks against the United States;6 4)
reports, practice, and ambiguous statements by executive officials, which
together suggest that internal executive actors continue to debate the contours
of which groups come under the AUMF umbrella, including groups, such as al-

63.
See infra Section II.B.
64.
See Preston Speech, supra note 2 (using ambiguous language about al Nusra and
Khorasan group); see also Cook, supra note 57 (suggesting ambiguity surrounding classification of al
Nusra members).
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Shabaab, which are engaged in regional struggles but whose leaders may have
strong ties with or support al Qaeda.
This constellation of data points is less complicated than it appears. In
fact, we have narrowed our inquiry over the Executive's co-belligerency theory
quite a bit. We can glean from this information that the Executive's internal
position on which groups can be considered "associated forces" or "cobelligerents" is somewhere between the two following poles: 1) a more
stringent rule that would cover only groups that directly engage in active
hostilities against the United States, on the one hand, and 2) a lower threshold
that would include groups that provide support to al Qaeda-through training,
weapons, sharing of training camps, or even shared ideology or fighting against
some common enemy-but have not necessarily as yet engaged in active
hostilities against the United States. We can call these, respectively, the active
hostilities test and the support test. As I will demonstrate in Part II, each of
these legal theories can be traced to a specific source, as well as to distinct sides
in policy debates, and these policy debates help explain why officials within the
Executive may be inclined toward one position or the other.
The outward ambiguity in the Executive's approach is likely the result of
continued internal uncertainty and tension over what the Executive's test
should be. Decision makers at times employ "constructive ambiguity" to paper
over real substantive disagreement with careful drafting, thus permitting the
debate to continue for as long as feasible, to be decided only when absolutely
necessary.6 s This ambiguity may account for the Administration's continuing
internal arguments over the extent to which a group like al Shabaab falls within
the AUMF (or may be the result of that debate), and may also account for the
66
odd and ambiguous wording in the Preston speech on al Nusrah. Perhaps
internal actors were arguing about the Executive's position right up until the
moment of the speech. 67
All of this suggests that while the Executive has publicly announced a
strict-sounding test to cabin its expansive AUW interpretation, that announced
test may mask significant continued ambiguity and fluidity in the test under the
surface. Internal strife continues over the precise contours of the underlying

See Susan Biniaz, Comma But Differentiated Responsibilities: Punctuation and 30 Other
65.
Ways Negotiators Have Resolved Issues in the International Climate Change Regime 2-3 (June 2016)
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climatemanuscript),
(unpublished
change/files/Publications/biniaz_.2016junecomma_diffresponsibilities.pdf (discussing the use of
"constructive ambiguity" in multilateral treaty negotiation and drafting in order to reach agreement on
matters still contested); Rebecca ingber, The Obarna War Powers Legacy and the Internal Forces that
Entrench Executive Power, AM. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2016).
Preston Speech, supra note 2 (identifying the "Nusrah Front and, specifically, those
66.
members of al-Qa'ida referred to as the Khorasan Group in Syria" as an associated force). For an
example of executive officials using ambiguous language to paper over internal disputes on a legal
position, see SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 58, at 341-42 (stating that executive officials remained
"studiously ambiguous" on the legal theory for detaining a Somali prisoner, Ahmed Warsame, because
different officials held different positions, but agreed that, at a minimum, he was detainable under either

theory).
For a discussion of how speechmaking prompts the executive branch to congeal internal
67.
legal positions, see Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal
Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 359, 397-403 (2013).
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legal theory. Among the options executive officials are debating-and possibly
relying upon-is a different and potentially lower threshold for finding a group
targetable under the AUMF other than the one that the announced approach
suggests. In the meantime, the constructive ambiguity that permits the
continued existence of multiple legal theories preserves discretion for executive
officials to act on either basis.68 In other words, this continued tension over
which legal theory will ultimately prevail preserves even more flexibility for
executive officials to act than they would have if they were to choose one
theory or the other.
Despite this ambiguity over its underlying legal theory, the Executive has,
to date, entrenched the principle of expanding the AUMF to include associated
forces in both the courts and Congress. And it has done so largely by asserting
compliance with this limiting principle, a test that it has presented as clearly
established, pedigreed, and constraining of executive action. 69 Ultimately, by
asserting adherence to a legal principle-even one that has evidently been
poorly understood or misjudged-the Executive has reserved for itself the
ability to continue its internal arguments about what the precise contours of its
theory will be, and perhaps also to continue pushing on the outer boundaries of
that theory as facts on the ground evolve. And those evolving facts include not
only the nature of the armed conflict but also the President's fraught
relationship with Congress.
II.

SOURCING THE MODERN TEST(S)

Now that we have established the competing executive branch legal
theories over the concept of co-belligerency, this Part will dissect them, unearth
the sources on which they rely, and identify the concerns, policy motivations,
and practical implications associated with each.
A.

The Support Test

The support test, under which the AUMF extends to groups that provide
significant support, but do not necessarily directly attack, the United States,
made its public debut in Goldsmith and Bradley's seminal Harvard Law
Review piece in 2005.0 As I will discuss in Part Elf, the support test likely
traces to slightly earlier origins within the Bush Administration itself, but the
law review article nevertheless was the first and remains the most detailed
public exposition of that theory. Through two administrations it has been the
Executive's key source for this support-based version of the co-belligerency
concept.n

68.
See Ingber, supra note 65.
69.
For a discussion of the Executive's explicit reliance on strictly stated legal tests that do
not necessarily accord with the looser interpretation it may take internally, see Sinnar, supra note 14.
70.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43.
71.
See, e.g., Al-Bihani Brief, supra note 59, at 31 (citing Bradley and Goldsmith for its
reliance on neutrality law and co-belligerency in informing the AUMF); Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at
28, 29, 33, 34.
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At the time of their 2005 piece, Bradley and Goldsmith had both recently
completed service in the executive branch. Bradley had left a position as
counselor to the Legal Adviser at the State Department and Goldsmith had left
his post as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice.
Shortly after leaving the government they co-wrote the highly influential article
that presented a theory for a flexible interpretation of the President's statutory
war powers in the conflict with al Qaeda, which continues to guide
interpretation of the AUMF today. As one small component of that theory,
Bradley and Goldsmith proposed a reading of the 2001 AUMF that would
extend to groups that supported al Qaeda in its fight against the United States,
arguing that Presidents have historically read congressional authorizations
broadly to include force against additional "entities [that] had a nexus to the
named enemy."

72

Bradley and Goldsmith termed these groups beyond core-al Qaeda that
should be covered under the AUMF al Qaeda "co-belligerents." In seeking
content for determining the scope of application of that concept, they suggested
looking to principles in neutrality law, under which a state at war was
historically permitted to respond-at times with force-to neutral states that
violated their neutrality by supporting the state's enemies. 73 In particular, they
pointed to the requirements "that the neutral state must not participate in acts of
war by the belligerent, must not supply war materials to a belligerent, and must
not permit belligerents to use its territory to move troops or munitions, or to
establish wartime communication channels." According to Bradley and
Goldsmith, "a state can become a co-belligerent . . . through systematic or
significant violations of its duties under the law of neutrality," thus making it a
74
lawful target of military force by the opposing party.
Drawing on this test for modem purposes, the argument is that, just as
historically under principles of neutrality law a nation might have responded
with force to other states that systematically violated their neutrality obligations
in supporting that nation's enemies, today the United States may use force
against new entities that provide a certain level of support to its enemy, al
Qaeda. Incorporating this argument into the domestic statute, in accordance
with their view that domestic war authorizations should be read expansively,
the authors suggest that the AUMF should be interpreted to provide the
President with authority to use force against such supporting actors and groups
in addition to the core groups explicitly contemplated by the 2001 AUMF,
namely al Qaeda and Taliban forces.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 2111-12. As evidence, they pointed to U.S.
72.
operations against Vichy France in World War II. In that conflict, their argument went, the U.S.
President did not seek additional congressional authorization before attacking the Vichy forces in French
North Africa, based in part upon their loose alliance with Germany. But see Ryan Goodman, Debunking
the "Vichy France" Argument on Authorization To Use Forceagainst Co-Belligerents, JUST SECURITY
http://justsecurity.org/l7516/debunking-vichy-france-argument10:37 AM),
17, 2014,
(Nov.
authorization-force-co-belligerents/ ("Vichy France should not count as a case of the President waging
war against a co-belligerent without specific congressional authorization" because, inter alia, "the
United States considered Vichy a "neutral" not a co-belligerent of Germany.").
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 2111-12.
73.

74.

Id. at 2112.
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PracticalImplications ofa Support Test

Under a support test for interpreting the AUMF, the Executive would be
authorized to use force against groups that provide a certain level of support to
al Qaeda, even if they do not first initiate direct attacks on the United States. Al
Qaeda has a web of affiliates with different levels of connection to the specific
conflict with the United States. Regional groups like al Shabaab, in Somalia, or
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), may have at various points in the
last 15 years shared resources, or even ideology, with al Qaeda, but may
nevertheless be focused primarily on a localized fight and not on attacking the
United States. Members of these groups may individuallyjoin al Qaeda; reports
suggest, for example, that internal disagreement within the executive branch
over the use of force against al Shabaab have at times been resolved practically
through a decision to use force against only particular actors in leadership roles
who were also members of al Qaeda, in contrast to using force against the
group as a whole, which would include foot soldiers who may have had no
interest in fighting the United States. 5
I noted in Part I reports of internal debates within the Executive regarding
the scope of the associated forces theory. The Support Test bolsters the
argument for using force against groups like al Shabaab and others who may
not have directly initiated hostilities against the United States, but who are
nevertheless engaged in the sharing of resources with al Qaeda. The extent to
which such a group would fall within the original Bradley/Goldsmith model of
this theory depends on the extent to which such a group engages in behavior
that would be analogous, in a state-to-state conflict, to "systematic or
significant violations of its duties under the law of neutrality."7 6
2.

Problems with the Support Test

The neutrality-derived support test has some fairly significant doctrinal
problems. Some concerns over a neutrality law-based approach to interpretation

75.
See, e.g., SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 58, at 274-79. The legal theory governing
force against al Shabaab has been complicated even further in recent strikes. In March 2016, an
American airstrike on an al Shabaab camp killed about 150 low-level fighters, but U.S. sources
attributed this not to a decision to label al Shabaab an associated force, but rather to a "tactical defense
of U.S. and partner nation ground force units," based on the "imminent threat to U.S. and African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISON) forces" posed by those fighters. See Letter from Joe Sowers, Dep't of
State, to Charlie Savage, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents
/2757459-shabab-dod- [hereinafter Sowers letter]; see also Letter from Barack Obama, President, U.S.,
to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, (June 13, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/13/letter-president-war-powers-resolution
(reporting strikes in Somalia on "al-Qa'ida and associated elements of al-Shabaab" and specifically on
members of al-Shabaab who are "part of al-Qa'ida," and other strikes in defense of the United States and
AMISON forces). Sowers's letter carefully parsed that, while the U.S. forces were not at this time
labeling al Shabaab an "associated force," they were also not saying that al Shabaab was not an
associated force. Sowers letter, supra ("The fact that an al-Qa'ida-affiliated group has not been
identified as an 'associated force' for purposes of the AUMF does not mean that the United States has
made a final determination that the group is not an 'associated force.' We are prepared to review this
question whenever a situation arises in which it may be necessary to take direct action against a terrorist

group.").
76.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 2112.
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of the AUMF-such as the incongruity of applying old concepts developed for
conflicts between states to conflicts with non-state groups such as al Qaedahave by now been thoroughly ventilated, though only in recent years and
possibly too late to gain much traction in curtailing reliance on the test.77 These
are legitimate concerns, but they almost prove too much. Much of the
Executive's legal theories regarding the conflict with al Qaeda look to
principles from bodies of law that may not have been designed with the current
circumstances in mind. Jettisoning reliance on analogy as a means of
understanding the legal rules for the conflict would mean dismantling the
United States' entire legal architecture for the conflict with al Qaeda-in many
cases the constraints along with the powers. It is hard to imagine the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the President all suddenly reversing course on the
overarching legal structure governing the conflict. That said, there are deeper
flaws in the support test that have been overlooked in the scholarship and in
other critiques of the test, and which there is reason to believe neither Congress
nor the courts have generally considered.
3.

The Neutrality Law Problem

Before taking on the neutrality-derived support test on its own terms, it is
worth first pausing to flesh out the myriad problems inherent in the extension
of neutrality law principles to a modem conflict between a state and a non-state
actor such as the conflict with al Qaeda, which alone might be fatal to reliance
on the test.
First, neutrality law as a general framework simply does not map onto the
conflict between the United States and ISIS or al Qaeda, neither as a formal
matter nor as a functional one. There is a reason that neutrality law does not
tend to enter modem discourse with great frequency, unless one is chatting with
a history buff. Many view neutrality law as generally obsolete in the modem
era; at a minimum any right to use force in response to a violation of neutrality
falling below an armed attack does not survive the U.N. Charter's regulation of
the use of force.78 Historically, in the pre-Charter era, neutrality law developed
77.

See, e.g., JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (2015);

Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 75, 78, 81, 88-89, 96, 104 (2011); Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED
KILLINGS: LAW & MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 60, 70-72 (Finkelstein et al. eds., 2011)

(questioning whether the concept of co-belligerency can be translated to apply to conflicts with non-state
actors); Remarks by Hina Shamsi, 104 AS[L PROC. 165, 167 (2010).
The U.N. Charter contains exceptions to this prohibition-e.g. for a response in self78.
defense to an armed attack-but reprisals for neutrality law violations are not included among the
exceptions. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4) & 51; see also Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 487-93 (Fleck ed., 1995) (recognizing that

the U.N. Charter and the practice of states have "modiflied] the traditional law of neutrality" and in
particular noting that the U.N. Charter now prohibits reprisals against violations of neutrality); c.f
GREENSPAN, supra note 47, at 531 (stating that "[tihe traditional rules of neutrality continue to apply in
international conflicts which are not subject to collective action under the United Nations Charter"
though failing to elaborate on what that might mean for the prohibition on using force except under the
circumstances provided by the Charter). Some elements of neutrality law appear to continue postCharter. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (recognizing the existence of neutral powers, several years after
the negotiation and signing of the UN Charter).
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to regulate the relationship between states not at war (neutrals) and warring
states (belligerents).79 States that wished to avoid being drawn into the war
could adopt "neutral" status. Neutral states were generally required to comport

'

with the twin duties of non-participation in the conflict and impartiality as
between the belligerent parties.
Neutrality law also governed the remedies for belligerent states to
retaliate against violations of neutrality by neutral states. Such recourse ran the
gamut from protest to financial compensation to reprisals to declarations of
war.80 A violation of neutrality did not by itself spell the end of neutrality.8
And not every violation of neutrality brought about a right of reprisal by force
in return.8 2 Moreover, even violations of neutrality that were sufficiently
extreme to warrant a use of force in return did not themselves bring about an
end to neutrality. 83 Rather the choice was the victim state's; after a sufficiently
extreme breach of neutrality, the victim state could then choose whether to use
force or declare war in retaliation against the violator, or choose another
remedy for the breach of neutrality.84
Today, scholars disagree over the extent to which any principles of
neutrality law survive the U.N. Charter,85 which prohibits the use of force
outside of certain narrow exceptions." Those codified exceptions include
Security Council authorizations and self-defense in response to an armed
attack. Not included are reprisals for neutrality law violations.87 Even if some
principles from the neutrality law era continue today, it is unlikely that the use
of force against non-belligerent states in retaliation for purported neutrality law
violations survives the Charter, if such acts would not otherwise qualify under
the recognized exceptions like self-defense.
If the general obsolescence of neutrality law were not sufficient to render
it inapplicable to today's conflict with al Qaeda, there are a few additional
hurdles. One obvious distinction is that neutrality law developed to regulate the
relationship between states, and as such did not apply-certainly as a formal

79.
For a discussion of neutrality law and its relevance to the conflict with al Qaeda, see
generally Ingber, supra note 77.
80.

Id. at 88; see, e.g., GREENSPAN, supra note 47, at 584 (discussing a range of remedies for

breach of neutrality from protest to compensation to reprisals and declaration of war).
81.

See Ingber, supra note 77, at 87-88; see also EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS

BOOK Ill: OF WAR §§ 95-97 (1758) (States have a "right" to respond with force against those who assist
their enemies in war, but that a state of war is not automatic; rather states may "overlook" such actions
rather than "always coming to an open rupture with those who give such assistance to [their] enemy."
The opposite result would be "highly inimical to the peace of nations!").
82. See Ingber, supra note 77, at 87-88.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Many scholars trace the "unwilling unable" test to neutrality law. Under that test, a state
may use force to address a threat on a neutral state's territory when that latter state is "unwilling or
unable" to mitigate the threat itself. The "unwilling unable" test is itself not without controversy, but
many scholars and states consider it a norm of customary international law, or at least a "wellentrenched norm." See Ashley S. Deeks, Unwilling or Unable: Toward a Normative Frameworkfor
ExtraterritorialSelf-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 499-501 (2012).
86.
See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4) & 51.
87.
Id.
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matter-to conflicts between a state and a non-state actor.88 Even putting
formalities aside, the purpose of neutrality law is to impose impartiality on
neutral states as between the warring parties. No responsible party today would
argue that states must remain impartial as between a legitimate state and a
terrorist organization bent on destroying it and killing civilians in order to do
so.
It is quite likely that actors within the executive branch have today
recognized some of these criticisms of the support test. Executive officials
seem to be at pains to suggest that the co-belligerency theory requires some
measure of "join[ing] the fight" against the United States, which may suggest a
test that is higher than "systematic violations of neutrality," but it is impossible
to know without further explanation from executive officials. But if these
arguments against the applicability of a concept developed for relations
between states have not had much traction, this may be due in part to the fact
that such arguments could well be levied against every component of the U.S.
Government's legal theory for the conflict with al Qaeda. In fact, the entire
legal architecture of the conflict, from detention to use of force, rests largely on
analogy to the laws that developed to govern conflicts between states. 89
Moreover, the neutrality law argument has some resonance; if states
historically viewed certain acts and not others as amounting to acts sufficient to
trigger a use of force in response, then that might be helpful in thinking about
how to understand and define modem belligerent acts outside of clearly
delineated or codified areas like the U.N. Charter. The Charter by its terms
clearly regulates uses of force against the territory of sovereign states. It does
not therefore formally regulate the use of force against non-state actors per se.
Such uses of force raise sovereignty issues when non-state actors act from the
territory of a sovereign state, and thus implicate the U.N. Charter on those
grounds, but how to overcome that sovereignty hurdle is distinct from the
question of force against the non-state armed group itself. The sovereignty
question can be answered separately: for example, when the territorial state
provides consent to the use of force in its territory in a way that does not
provide an answer to what law governs the use of force against that non-state
actor itself.

88.
See Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, supra note 77, at 71. There are some notable
exceptions to this general rule. During the U.S. Civil War, for example, states recognized the state of
belligerency between the north and south and undertook obligations of neutrality toward the parties. See
GREENSPAN, supra note 47, at 584. It is exceptionally unlikely, however, that states today will take a
similar approach to the conflict between states and al Qaeda or ISIS.
89.
See, e.g., March 13 Brief, supra note 39; Memorandum from the Off. of Legal Counsel to
the Att'y Gen. (Feb. 19, 2010), Lethal OperationAgainst Shaykh Anwar al-A ulaqi; Memorandum from
the Off. of Legal Counsel to the Att'y Gen. (July 16, 2010), Applicability ofFederal CriminalLaws and
the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal OperationsAgainst Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi [hereinafter OLC
Memorandum on al Aulaki, July 2010].
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The Wrong InternationalLaw Test for The Domestic Law
Purpose

Let us then take the neutrality law theory behind the support test on its
face. Even assuming that neutrality law in some way informs modem
understandings of the use of force, and assuming arguendo any applicability to
a conflict with a non-state actor (a big lift, considering the foregoing), it is
nevertheless the wrong international law test for this domestic purpose.
Recall for a moment that domestic law purpose: the interpretation of the
appropriate outer parameters of a 2001 congressional force authorization to the
President. The argument by those seeking to read the statute to extend beyond
core al Qaeda is that congressional intent and common sense mandate it extend
to groups that "join[] with the Taliban or al Qaida in its fight against the United
States."90 In other words, the argument goes, we should read the AUMF as
extending to groups that become parties to this conflict.
The neutrality law-based support test does not answer this question, even
if we accept some application of neutrality law principles to the current conflict
today. Under neutrality law, a state that violated neutrality could in some
instances become subject to attack in response, but did not automatically
become a party to the conflict. The victim state had a choice of response, war
being only one of the options. Violations of neutrality thus did not themselves
end neutrality; only a subsequent declaration of war or direct attacks would
bring neutrality to an end and turn the parties into belligerents. 9' Thus
international law in the pre-Charter era may have made a significant violator of
neutrality a potential target, but it did not make the violator an automatic party
to the conflict. Put another way, the difference is analogous to the distinction in
contract law between a contract that is merely voidable and one that is in fact
void. A contrary rule-one that would immediately deem the neutrality violator
a belligerent party to the conflict-would result in more war, or at least the
inevitable expansion and perpetuation of existing wars. Instead, neutrality law
created avenues for states to avoid war through recourse to alternative
reparations. 92
Recognizing that historic right of belligerents to respond with force to
certain violations of neutrality, Goldsmith and Bradley make a seemingly small
leap: they argue that under neutrality law, a neutral state was not merely
potentially subject to attack, but indeed would "become a co-belligerent ...

90.
Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 30; see also Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26.
91.
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 358, at 752 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
7th ed. 1952). Similar rules governed and continue to govern neutral merchant vessels, which are
understood to take on "enemy character" only when they are "owned or controlled by a belligerent," or
take a "direct part in the hostilities on the side of the enemy." DEP'T OF THE NAVY & DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

§§

7.5-7.5.1

(2007) [hereinafter 2007 COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
92.
See VATTEL, supra note 81, § 95 ("Some authors decide in general, that whoever joins our
enemy, or assists him against us with money, troops, or in any other manner whatever, becomes thereby
our enemy, and gives us a right to make war against him: - a cruel decision, and highly inimical to the
peace of nations! It cannot be supported by principles; and happily the practice of Europe stands in
opposition to it.").
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through systematic or significant violations of its duties under the law of
neutrality."93 This is incorrect, however, and overstates the consequences of a
neutrality breach. In fact, such a violator might risk becoming a target and
ultimately a party to the conflict, a co-belligerent, but this result was far from
inevitable. While it might seem like a small distinction, it is a distinction
backed by a laudable goal: a historic desire to constrain war, rather than to
amplify it, to the extent feasible. 94 And in fact, that desire to limit expansion of
the war is the precise policy reason for pushback on the support approach
today.9 5
If the Bradley/Goldsmith approach is a slight overstating of the
international law effects of a neutrality breach, it is one with significant
consequences for the domestic law argument. For under the Bradley/Goldsmith
approach, once that support passes a certain threshold, the group is
automatically a party to the conflict and covered by the congressional
authorization. Yet the neutrality law does not answer that question; rather, were
it to apply here, it would leave the decision of whether to declare war on a
particular group to the victim state and its domestic processes. And who within
the state makes the decision whether to declare war on a given entity?
International law does not answer that question. Rather, that is a matter for a
state's domestic processes. And thus we are right back where we started: trying
to interpret the extent to which Congress has authorized the President to use
force.
As a matter of international law, by contrast, neutrality law might shed
which kinds of actions in the pre-Charter era might have rendered a
on
light
target as a matter of international law. But it does not define
potential
a
state
which groups have already joined the fight. And thus, if we are to read the
AUMF as covering groups that have joined the fight, neutrality law does not
answer that question. Rather, the neutrality-derived support test might be
relevant if the theory were that Congress intended to authorize the President not
only to use force against existing parties to the conflict, but also against any
parties that could potentially be subject to force under international law, even if
international law itself would not consider them already to be parties to the
conflict. This is neither a plausible reading of the statute, nor is it the
government's position, upon which the courts and Congress have relied in
ratifying or acquiescing to the Executive's interpretation of the statute to extend
to associated forces. That position is that the AUMF should be read to apply to
groups that have joined the fight alongside al Qaeda against the United States.
International law does provide some content that may be useful in
understanding that question, but it stems from a different source, and it is not a
96
perfect fit, as I will explain in the Section that follows.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 2112.
93.
See VATTEL, supra note 81, §§ 95-97.
94.
Harold Hongju Koh, How to End the Forever War, YALE GLOB. ONLINE MAG. (May 14,
95.
2013), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/how-end-forever-war (discussing the risk that an overly
flexible "associated forces" theory could extend the war indefinitely).
See Part II.
96.
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The Active Hostilities Test
-

The Executive's "active hostilities test"-in contrast to the support test
requires that a group have engaged in active hostilities against the United
States, alongside al Qaeda, or now presumably ISIS, before it may be labeled a
"co-belligerent" or "associated force." We can derive the Executive's reliance
on this test primarily from two of the data points I describe in Part 1: 1) the
language of the Obama Administration's professed "associated forces"
standard, which includes a requirement that a group have "entered the fight
alongside al Qaeda" and is "in hostilities against the United States"; and 2)
media reports and practice that suggest that, despite internal debate and
pressure, the Executive has not to date labeled as associated forces or targeted
under that theory groups like al Shabaab that are engaged in regional struggles
and not, as a whole, directly operating against the United States.97 These data
points-even the Executive's professed approach-are not dispositive. As
discussed, it is not entirely clear that the Executive interprets the "entered the
fight" language strictly to require real violence. And the reticence to label al
Shabaab or others as associated forces may be as much related to policy as it is
to law, though this is an area where policy and law are so intertwined that it is
simply not possible to distinguish which is playing the constraining role.98
The Executive has never cited a specific foundation for its active
hostilities test, yet there is good reason to think that it has derived this test from
a different source in international law. The two prongs of the associated forces
theory-the requirement that the group be "an organized, armed group" and
that it has "entered the fight alongside al Qaeda" "in hostilities against the
United States" -happen to map almost perfectly onto a different international
law test, and one that more accurately fits the domestic law purpose the
Administration relies upon for its AUMF interpretation. This is the twopronged test that the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia put
forward in the 1995 Tadid case for determining the existence of a conflict with
a non-state actor, which I will discuss below.
While the Executive has never, to my knowledge, explicitly stated that it
looks to the Tadid test in interpreting the "associated forces" covered by the
AUMF, this test's relevance to the Executive's stated purpose heredetermining whether particular entities have "entered the fight," or in other
words, are party to an armed conflict with the United States-as well as the
striking similarity between the language in the two tests, suggests that it is quite
likely that the Executive officials who crafted and endorse the "active
hostilities" approach have Tadid in mind.

97.
See supra notes 58, 75. It is less clear what the Executive's position is toward groups like
al Nusra that occupy a middle ground between initiating direct action against the United States and
focusing on a regional struggle. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
ambiguous language in the Preston Speech.
98.
See, e.g., Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the
Transformation of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War
Governance, 5 HARv. NAT'L SECURITY J. 225, 229 (2014).
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The Tadid Test

In 1995, in the admittedly very different international criminal law
context, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
put forward in the Tadid case a standard for determining the existence of a noninternational armed conflict (NIAC), in other words, a conflict with a non-state
actor such as al Qaeda, which is today the most well-established test for that
purpose.99 This Tadi6 test has two prongs for establishing the existence of a
NIAC: (a) "protracted armed violence," (b) between the state and "organized
armed groups." 00 The ICTY's purpose in employing this test was in finding
the existence of an armed conflict in order to determine the applicability of
international humanitarian law. But the test's requirement that an armed
conflict can only exist when a specified level of violence exists with parties that
meet a certain threshold of organization means that it is also a test for
determining the parties to a NAC.
As noted above, the two prongs of the Government's stated "associated
forces" theory share conspicuous similarities to the two prongs of the Tadid
test. There is good reason, therefore, to think that the Administration-or the
forces within the Administration that wanted to push the Executive's standard
toward an active hostilities approach-had this test in mind when crafting the
associated forces language. Recall that the Government's approach requires
that an associated force be "an organized, armed group that has entered the
0
fight alongside al Qaeda" and is "in hostilities against the United States."'
That statement is strikingly similar to the Tadi6 requirements of "an organized
armed group" and "protracted armed violence" between the parties.
One of many open questions-even if the Executive is relying on this and
not the support test-is the extent to which the Executive's practice as well as
its internal definitions of "entered the fight alongside al Qaeda" and "in
hostilities against the United States" map directly onto the Tadi6 standard for
"protracted armed violence." 02 Even if Tadid is the original source for this test,
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
99.
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 1995).
100. See Tadid, supra note 99, 170.
101. Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26.
102. Subsequent ICTY jurisprudence has further fleshed out the meaning of the organization
and protracted violence prongs, and what would be sufficient to meet each. See, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, %¶ 40-49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr.
3, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tug/en/080403.pdf (discussing ICTY jurisprudence on
the meaning of "protracted armed violence" and noting "indicative factors include the number, duration
and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the
number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the
fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing
combat zones," as well as the "involvement of the UN Security Council"); id. ¶ 60 (stating that "an
armed conflict can exist only between parties that are sufficiently organized to confront each other with
military means" and citing factors such as "command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms
within the group; the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the
ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training;
its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics;
its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with one
voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace accord"); see also Prosecutor v.

Hadlihasanovid, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment,

ff

14, 20, 23 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
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it is unlikely that the Executive feels bound by these strictures.o3 Regardless,
there is good reason to believe, based on the mixed data discussed in Part I, that
the appropriate source and legal theory behind the co-belligerency concept is a
continuous fount of debate within the current Administration. The existence of
that debate likely explains some potential for mixed practice, ambiguous
statements, statements that sound in a Tadid test while separately making
sporadic references to other sources such as the Bradley/Goldsmith test, as well
as the lack of any explicit reference to Tadid in the Executive's discussions of
co-belligerency.
2.

PracticalImplications of an Active Hostilities Test

Under an Active Hostilities test, only a group that initiated and directly
participated in real violence against the United States could fall within the
President's authority under the AUMF. And were the Executive to conform
strictly to a Tadid /parties test, only an organized armed group engaged in
protracted hostilities against the United States might be presumed covered,
though there is no evidence that Executive officials read the test that strictly.
Certainly a strict Tadid test, and even the modified version the Executive seems
to be espousing, likely casts a narrower net than the neutrality-derived support
test, which, as discussed above, includes groups that might not themselves be
engaged in active or protracted hostilities, but which provide more indirect
support to the war effort. A group like al Shabaab, which has not directly
attacked the United States, would not come within this definition. A group like
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), however, that has launched
multiple attempted attacks on the United States and U.S. interests abroad, such
as U.S. embassies, would come within either definition of an "associated force"
or "co-belligerent" of al Qaeda, though that group might not come within a
strict textual approach to the AUMF if it were read to cover only core al
Qaeda.'0
3.

Problems with the Active Hostilities Test

There are several potential problems with employing the Tadid test to
interpret the President's domestic authority under the AUMIF. First, the test has
its origins not in jus ad bellum but in international criminal law, in the context
of a judicial decision regarding the reach of its jurisdiction over alleged war
crimes. The Tadid tribunal's ability to determine the commission of war crimes
extended only so far as it determined the groups were parties to an armed
Yugoslavia
Mar.
15,
2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasanovic-kubura/tjug/en/hadjudg060315.pdf; Prosecutor v. Marti6, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶¶41, 343 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/jug/en/070612.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Mrklid, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶39, 40, 407-08 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrksic/tjug/en/070927.pdf.
103. See Modirzadeh, supra note 98 (discussing how the Executive borrows from different
bodies of law, mixing law and policy, without necessarily strictly following any given body to the
letter).
104. al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, U.S. NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR.,
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
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conflict;ios thus there is a reasonable argument to be made that its test for
determining the existence of such a conflict was looser than it might have been
in a different context, were its determination to be employed for the purposes of
06
extending a war, rather than to extend its own ability to judge malfeasance.
Second, the Executive has not to my knowledge explicitly endorsed the
Tadid test as a limit on the parties to the conflict, though that is not fatal to its
usefulness here. The Executive has referenced Tadid favorably in similar
contexts. 107 And there is good reason to believe that the Executive would
accept that a NIAC exists at a minimum under the conditions put forward by
the ICTY in Tadid, and that if the U.S. Government departs at all from the test
it is on the grounds that it is too narrow.' 08 It is thus a reasonable read of both a
widely accepted international law standard and the U.S. approach to that
standard that a NIAC exists at a minimum when there is protracted armed
violence between the state and an organized armed group.
Finally, there is an additional problem with the Tadid test that might
suggest that it is too stringent for our purposes. Tadid is a test for determining
the threshold for when hostilities have risen from mere acts of violence to the
level of armed conflict, as a matter of international law. Once there is already a
pre-existing armed conflict, however, some might argue that the threshold for
determining whether new parties have entered this conflict should be lower. In
other words, the "protracted violence" prong might not need to be met for each
additional group entering the conflict, as long as the level of violence in the
conflict overall met that threshold.
As a matter of considering congressional intent, the U.S. approach to
Tadi6 is the most relevant, and thus the latter two points are most problematic.
But neither of these caveats is fatal to employing the Tadid standard as a floor.
Under each of these understandings, the parties to a conflict include at a
minimum states and organized armed groups engaged in protracted armed
violence. Thus, if the AUMF covers all existing parties to the conflict as that
concept is understood under international law, then at a minimum it should be
understood to cover those groups that would meet the Tadi6 threshold:
organized armed groups engaged in protracted armed violence with the United
States. Going beyond that minimum floor set by Tadi6, I would argue, would
require new statutory language, because while international law might permit
use of force in such circumstances, there is no sufficiently well-established line
09
to suggest congressional intent to incorporate.

105. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IM 66-70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,

1995).
106.

Id.

107. See, e.g., OLC Memorandum on al Aulaki, July 2010, supra note 89, at 25-26 (looking to
international law sources including jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia for guidance on the existence and geographic scope of an armed conflict) (citing
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94- I AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int'l Crirn. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)).

108.

See id. at 25, 26, 28.

109.

See supra Section I.A.2.
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THE CO-BELLIGERENCY STORY: FROM INTENDED CONSTRAINT TO
GREYISH LEGAL SPACE

At this point I have attempted to demonstrate both that the Executive's
position is not precisely what it suggests, and that it is not as clearly
constraining as Executive officials have held it out to be. Parts I and II deduced
the likely legal range within which the Executive is operating, the internal
tension that lends itself toward continuing ambiguity and vacillation between
legal theories, and the likely sources for each of the Executive's potential
approaches. While all of the options for interpreting the AUIF are imperfect,
Part II demonstrated that some are more doctrinally sound than others, and each
advances different policy goals.
It is also evident, as I will discuss further in this Part, that the courts and
Congress, many within civil society, and even some critical actors within the
executive branch-in short, those responsible for overseeing and checking
executive assertions of power-have not sufficiently scrutinized, or do not
sufficiently understand, the Executive's actual approach or range of approaches
to interpreting the President's AUMF authority.
So, the theory is ambiguous, the sources are flawed, and yet the Executive
has not faced real pushback in this realm. How did this co-belligerency theory
come to be, why does it continue to play such a prominent role in executive
articulations of authority, and why have the courts and Congress not adequately
questioned it?
A. Executive Reliance on a Flawed Test
Potential executive reasons for relying on an ambiguous or flexible theory
to understand the scope of the President's AUMF authority are manifold. One
simple answer is a purely instrumental one: executive officials may not want to
foreclose options and thus prefer an approach that gives them as much
discretion as possible. The neutrality-derived support test likely suggests
broader authority for the President than an active hostilities test, as it does not
require that a group actively attack, or participate in active hostilities against,
the United States before the Executive may take action. Executive officials
need only determine that the group has provided some level of "support"maybe even a significant level of support but still not necessarily rising to
active hostilities-to al Qaeda or ISIS.1 10 The combination of these two
approaches might provide greater discretion yet. Thus, a simple instrumentalist
explanation for the current state of affairs is that the Executive declares itself
constrained by a strict "active hostilities" test in order to stave off interference
and project legitimacy, but that internally, it relies upon whichever test supports
the action it seeks to take.
That hypothetical rationale intersects intriguingly with a controversial
thread in the Executive's legal position on the micro level, in the Executive's

110.

Whether co-belligerents of co-belligerents are covered raises additional questions.
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approach to individual law of war detention.'I The Executive's stated position
on its detention authority includes a category of individuals who provide
"support" for al Qaeda in addition to those who meet traditional conceptions of
combatancy. 112 As with the Executive's co-belligerency test, it is not perfectly
clear whether the Executive's actual internal position includes support as an
independent basis for detention (or, for that matter, for related targeting
authority); its litigation positions in Guantanamo habeas cases have suggested
that it has attempted to avoid making support the sole basis for authority.'
Nevertheless, support remains as a basis for detention in the stated position.
This suggests that at both the micro and macro levels, internal debates over
how much weight to place on provision of support for al Qaeda or ISIS in
relation to the Executive's legal authority have resulted in constructive
ambiguity in executive branch positions, and ultimately that has meant more
flexibility and discretion for the Executive.'l1
There are good policy reasons to want to nip such support in the bud, and
a legal argument that would permit the President to use his most aggressive
tools against such actors is perhaps tempting. This goes beyond the use of
force. The Executive has, through two administrations, relied upon the AUMF
for a range of authorities as well as justification for finding exceptions to other
domestic rules, in the realms of targeting and detention (including of American
citizens),"' as well as domestic surveillance.1 6 Extension of the AUMF to
groups beyond al Qaeda or ISIS-and on the individual level, to a broad range
of actors providing support to these groups-means extension of all of these
authorities more broadly as well.117
Nevertheless, the Executive's persistent reliance on co-belligerency is
more complicated than a simple continuous power grab. Despite an
understandable desire to use the maximum extent of his tools to fight these
I11. The extent to which the following description carries over to targeting authority is
unclear, but released documents and recent reporting suggests that the Executive's targeting standard
relies in part upon the detention standard that evolved through the Guantanamo habeas litigation. See,
e.g., OLC Memorandum on al Aulaki, July 2010, supra note 89; SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 58,
at 282-83.
112. See, e.g., SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 58, at 148-52 (discussing debates over the
extent to which "substantial support" for al Qaeda could provide a standalone basis for detention).
113. See Ingber, supra note 65.

114.
115.

Id.
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507 (2014); OLC Memorandum on al

Aulaki, July 2010, supra note 89.
116.

See,

e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTORS GEN.,

REPORT ON PRESIDENT'S

SURVEILLANCE

PROGRAM 505 (2009), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/PSP-09-18-15-full.pdf (quoting this
modification as limiting the program to "al Qa'ida, . . . a group affiliated with al Qa'ida, or ... another
group that I determine for the purposes of this Presidential Authorization is in armed conflict with the
United States and poses a threat of hostile action within the United States"); Charlie Savage, George W.
Bush Made Retroactive N.S.A. 'Fix' After Hospital Room Showdown, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/2 1/us/politics/george-w-bush-made-retroactive-nsa-fix-after-hospitalroom-showdown.html (revealing that the Justice Department insisted on limiting the President's
surveillance "program to investigations of Al Qaeda, rather than allowing it to be used for other types of
international counterterrorism investigations, to make the argument that the program was legally
justified as a wartime measure").
117. In fact, the legal authority for a controversial drone strike against an American citizen in
Yemen, Anwar al Aulaqi, rested in part on a theory of co-belligerency between his group and al Qaeda.
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threats (particularly in a conflict that does not appear to have an end in sight),
the Executive has not since the early years of the Bush Administration
generally asserted preclusive authority for the President's wartime actions.' 18
Rather, executive officials and lawyers have gone to great pains to couch the
President's actions within a statutory framework.
Moreover the concept of co-belligerency first appeared in executive usage
(at least as a matter of public record) at a period within the Bush
Administration when some executive officials were quite notoriously trying to
roll back some of the more egregious assertions of executive power, and
working to conform the Administration's actions to more plausible legal
bases. 119 Consistent with this context, the turn toward an associated forces
concept in its early incarnation was in fact an attempt to narrow the
Executive's prior assertions of extraordinarily broad power, in order to bring
the Executive's actions in line with statutory authority under the AUMF. Later
the co-belligerency argument became part of an effort to retain that connection
to the AUMF, without ceding authority that the Executive had already
cemented vis-a-vis the courts and Congress.
Certainly the policy advantages of the current status quo play a role in
executive branch decision-making, but this instrumentalist account is far too
simplistic. The reality is more complex and ultimately counter-intuitive; it
involves attempts to seek to constrain the President's power within realistic
boundaries, the complex dynamics of executive bureaucracy, and the stickiness
of executive decisions once taken.1 20 To understand how these dynamics result
in the use and persistence of this test, we must trace its origins and continued
use by the executive branch over the course of a decade and more.
1.

Co-Belligerency: the Origin Story

Let us first recall the backdrop against which the associated forces and
co-belligerency language came into being. In the short days between the 9/11
attacks and the enactment of the AUMF on September 18, 2001, the Bush
Administration first asked Congress for significantly broader statutory authority
than it ultimately received. The Administration's proposed statute would have
permitted the President to use force to "deter and pre-empt any future acts of
terrorism or aggression against the United States."'21 The Administration failed
to obtain that language, and received instead the more limited authority granted
118. For early examples see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, at 34 (Mar. 13, 2002) ("We
conclude that as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, the President has the plenary constitutional
power to detain and transfer prisoners captured in war."); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel Dep't of
Defense, at 19 (Mar. 14, 2003) ("Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of enemy
combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the
President.").
119. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 141-76; SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 53842 (discussing
Goldsmith's overturning of the early torture memos, which were revised and reinstated after his
departure); Savage, supra note 112.
120. Ingber, supra note 67.
121. See Abramowitz, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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by the 2001 AUMF, 122 tying the use of force clearly to those involved in the
9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, in subsequent months and years executive officials
asserted broad authority, in part resting on the President's plenary Article II
power.1 23 In one early example, in November 2001, the President issued a
"Military Order" that asserted extraordinary authority to detain militarily or try
in a military commission any alien who "has engaged in, aided or abetted, or
conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism" or harbored such an
individual.1 24 The order contained no required link to al Qaeda, unlike the
strictures of the AUNIF.
References to "associated forces" or affiliates of al Qaeda came later, and
when viewed against this history, they can be seen as attempts not to broaden
but to limit the Executive's actions to some plausible connection to statutory
authority under the AUMF, in order to move away from preclusive claims of
wartime power. Executive officials first referred to "associated forces" publicly
in a 2004 order establishing an administrative process to review detentions of
military detainees at Guantanamo, issued partly in response to two Supreme
125
Court decisions challenging the Executive's detention processes. References
to "associates" or "affiliates" of al Qaeda as a means of explaining the reach of
the AUMF beyond core al Qaeda can be found in that 2004 order and in
126
contemporaneous briefs asserting executive detention authority. But they can
also be found outside of core military activities like targeting and detention.
Recently released language in an internal IG report on President Bush's
surveillance program reveals that in March 2004, Department of Justice
officials narrowed the reach of a particular component of the program, to tie it
more clearly to AUMF authority. The new language restricted the program to
another group that I
"al Qa'ida, . . . a group affiliated with al Qa'ida, or ...
determine for the purposes of this Presidential Authorization is in armed
conflict with the United States and poses a threat of hostile action within the
United States."1 27 These last two categories look like an early incarnation of

122. Many have likewise criticized as "sweeping" the more tailored version of the statute that
was passed. See, e.g., Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 8.
123. See supra note Ill and accompanying text.
124. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66

Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833-34 (Nov. 13, 2001). The Military Order relied on both the President's Article
II authority, as well as the 2001 AUMF, but it notably did not cabin its scope to only those entities
contemplated by the statute.
125. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Dep. Sec'y of Def., to Gordon R. England, Sec'y of
the Navy (July 7, 2004) (establishing combatant status review tribunals).
126. See, e.g., Respondent's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d (Nov. 16, 2004) (defining "enemy combatant," as "an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners").
127. See IG Report on President's Surveillance Program (2009), supra note 116; see also Press
Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director
for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005); SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 192 (stating that Goldsmith's
insistence on narrowing the "Stellarwind" surveillance program to only AUMF-authorized activity "led
to the first analysis inside the executive branch of which groups counted as associatedforces or cobelligerents with al Qaeda," whom the NSA could monitor in addition to al Qaeda, under the AUMF).
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what ultimately would become the Obama Administration's two-pronged
associated forces approach.1 28
None of these documents suggest what test the Executive was then using
to determine which groups might fall within this language. And the term "cobelligerent" itself does not at the time of these documents appear in conjunction
with the "associated forces" language. But there is nevertheless publicly
available evidence that suggests officials within the Executive were already
grappling with the contours of the concept and considering its relevance to the
endeavor to tie the President's actions to statutory authority. A published 2004
OLC memo discusses co-belligerency in a more traditional context: as
connoting allies of the United States for the purposes of determining the reach
of treaty provisions.1 29 In seeking to determine which states might be
appropriately construed as co-belligerents of the United States, the memo
grapples with how to understand this concept. 30 In doing so, it looks to
principles of neutrality law and hints at the ideas the Administration may have
been considering at that time with respect to its associated forces theory.' 3
Indeed, the author of the 2004 OLC memo and head of the office at that time,
Jack Goldsmith, co-authored the 2005 law review article proposing the
neutrality-derived support test shortly after leaving office. But the
Administration itself did not reference co-belligerency publicly to support the
associated forces claim until it was forced to defend its theory, in a 2008 brief
supporting detention authority over a Uighur detainee at Guantanamo, Hufaiza
Parhat.132 That brief makes an argument that is recognizably similar to the one
made by the Executive in briefs and speeches today: the AUMIF should be read
to cover groups that "join[] forces with al Qaeda or the Taliban" and that this
interpretation was supported by the "established laws-of-war concept of 'cobelligerency."" 33 The specific theory in that case was that Parhat had engaged
in military training at a camp run by the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement
(ETIM), a militant organization focused on a regional struggle particularly
against China, but which had ties to and derived resources from al Qaeda, and
which the government argued was a co-belligerent of al Qaeda.134 As ETIM
itself was not clearly contemplated by the AUMF, the Executive's detention
128.
authority.
129.

In the latter these are conjunctive; both are required pieces, not alternative sources of
Office of Legal Counsel, "Protected Person" Status in Occupied Iraq under the Fourth

Geneva Convention, 28 Op. O.L.C. 35, 43 (2004) [hereinafter "2004 OLC Memo"].
130. Id.
131. Indeed, the predominant source referenced in this section of the memo is the very same
later referenced in the Goldsmith and Bradley Article suggesting the neutrality-derived co-belligerency
test for interpreting the AUMF, and is later referenced in U.S. briefs on the same subject. See, e.g.,

Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009); 2004 OLC Memo, supra note 129 (citing
Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN

LAW IN ARMED

CONFLICTS 385, 495 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1999)).
132. Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 30 (citing the Bradley & Goldsmith article and its sources);
see infra Section B. There is also language in the 2006 Military Commissions Act simply referencing

"co-belligerents of the enemy." Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
133. Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 30.
134. Id. Parhat himself denied membership in ETIM, in addition to disputing the theory of cobelligerency with al Qaeda.
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theory relied upon an interpretation of the AUMF that would extend to groups
sharing resources with al Qaeda. This, and Bradley and Goldsmith's 2005 law
review article, was the extent of the public discourse on the test during the
course of the Bush Administration.
2.

The Test in Transition

Obama Administration officials came into office prepared to thoroughly
reconsider Bush-era practices, in part via a comprehensive review by Executive
Order-established task forces.1 35 Yet, those planned, deliberative processes
were almost immediately overtaken by the urgent press of ongoing litigation in
the Guantanamo habeas cases.1 36 The new Administration's detention position,
including its views on the extension of the AUMF to "associated forces," thus
evolved not through the task forces it had established for such purposes, but
through the course of litigation over legacy detention policies. As I have
written elsewhere, the development of legal views in the course of defensive
litigation is a very different process, and is likely to produce very different
37
results, from other executive processes for determining a legal position.' In
defensive litigation almost all factors-from the actors holding the pen, who
are generally career litigators, to the institutional Justice Department biases in
favor of protecting executive power and preserving room for senior
policymakers to maneuver, to the task at hand, which is zealously defending
executive practice-weigh in favor of pushing a legal position that is as
protective as possible of prior executive policies and future executive
flexibility.' 38 This is not the forum in which the Executive is likely to produce
its most forward-leaning, executive-constraining legal positions.' 39 And it is all
the more difficult, as we shall see in the next Section, for executive officials in
the midst of defense litigation to dial back executive positions that courts or
Congress have already seemed to accept.
The Executive's initial 2009 brief-or the "March 13 Brief," as it is
widely identified-made a few real 40 and some cosmetic'41 changes to the
prior Administration's legal theory. But it continued to rely on the concept of
"co-belligerency" as support for the government's argument that it could detain
135. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No.
13,493, Review of Detention Policy Options (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order 13,491, Ensuring Lawful
Interrogations(Jan. 22, 2009); see also SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 101-04.
136. See, e.g., March 13 Brief, supra note 39.
137. See Ingber, supra note 67, at 378-91.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 390-91.
140. In particular, it disavowed reliance on sole Article 11 authority for detention, thus tying the
President's detention authority entirely to the 2001 AUMF, and it linked this authority to international
law. The Administration also added the adjective "substantial" to the kind of support that would qualify
to make someone detainable, but precisely what this change signifies has never been tested. March 13
Brief, supra note 39.
141. With this brief the Administration ceased use of the term "unlawful enemy combatant"
though the legal theory for detention-that these individuals were analogous to regular combatants and
thus detainable until the end of hostilities, but unlike privileged combatants did not receive POW
status-remained the same. Id.
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associated forces.1 42 While the March 13 Brief merely mentioned the term,
subsequent briefs sometimes sourced the concept to the Bradley and Goldsmith
article and to principles of neutrality law.143 Disparity between the initial brief
and later references to the Bradley and Goldsmith article might be attributable
to differences in the level of political or career control over the original and
subsequent briefs. Recall that Bradley and Goldsmith had both served within
the Bush Administration, and that the new Obama Administration was keen to
draw a clear line in the sand from the prior Administration on these matters.
Press reports suggest that the March 13 Brief reached the highest-level scrutiny
imaginable for a district court filing; the President himself is said to have
reviewed it." Later briefs would hardly have seen the same level of political
scrutiny; rather they would have been drafted and filed almost entirely by
career civil servants, many of whom would have worked on these matters and
filed similar briefs under the prior Administration. In fact, the top career
litigators named on the Parhat brief, which first raised the co-belligerency
theory during the Bush Administration, are the very same named on the only
two briefs that explicitly cite the Goldsmith and Bradley source under the
Obama Administration.' 45 Though these career officials would have operated
loosely under the supervision of political heads of office, those political
appointees may not have noticed or cared about the subtle difference of
choosing to cite a source that supported the very legal theory the President
himself had previously signed off on espousing. 146
As press reports and the Obama Administration itself suggested in its
initial briefs, the Administration seems to have filed these first briefs in the
Guantanamo cases assuming that it would later revisit its policies with the
luxury of more time.1 47 But as things so often happen in the government, this
plan was overtaken by events; the Guantanamo litigation pressed forward as
did other crises, and the Administration's detention position ultimately did not
change much from that initial March 13 Brief.1 48 If anything, the Executive's
position hardened into a more permissive standard as the courts accepted everlower evidentiary burdens on the government, and detainee releases became
more difficult and politically charged. 149

142. Id. at 7.
143.

See Al-Bihani Brief, supra note 59, at 31; Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 42 n.10,

Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-5306) [hereinafter Khan Briefn.
144.

See DANIEL KLA[DMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE

OBAMA PRESIDENCY 59 (2012).
145. Al-Bihani Brief, supra note 59, at 31; Khan Brief, supra note 143; Parhat Brief, supra
note 29.
146. Ingber, supra note 67, at 380-81 (discussing the significant authority wielded by career
litigators in crafting legal positions on behalf of the U.S. Government).
147. See KLAIDMAN, supra note 144, at 58-60; SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 117-21.
148. See, e.g., Government's Memorandum of Law in Support of Final Judgment Denying a
Permanent Injunction and Dismissing This Action, Hedges v. Obama, 2012 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
10884 (arguing that the President "has authority to detain individuals who, in analogous circumstances
in a traditional international armed conflict between the armed forces of opposing governments, would
be detainable under principles of co-belligerency").

149.

See, e.g., Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding detention authority

on scant evidence); Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding detention authority on

2017]

Co-Belligerency

105

The Administration was simultaneously facing decisions over whom it
could lawfully target, and heated debate reportedly raged internally over
whether to deem certain groups "associated forces" of al Qaeda, which would
mean that all of their members, not just those high-level officials who might
50
In the midst
have operational relationships with al Qaeda, could be targeted.
of this debate, Jeh Johnson gave a speech in which he outlined publicly for the
first time the Administration's two-prong test for deeming a group an
associated force.' 5 ' As discussed above, that statement left questions open for
the public, but it has been reported that questions remained open behind the
scenes as well.1 52 As the discussion of al Shabaab in Part II indicates, these
questions are not yet resolved. Debate over the Executive's position continues,
and it remains unclear where the executive branch will land on its view of
whether the AUMF applies to groups that merely provide support to al Qaeda
and now ISIS, or only to groups that directly initiate hostilities against the
United States.
This narrative suggests, perhaps counterintuitively, that certain Bush
Administration officials turned to theories and rhetoric regarding "associated
forces" and co-belligerency as a means of limiting what had been the
Administration's early extraordinary assertions of executive authority, and of
grounding the President's activities in statutory authority as opposed to claims
of plenary constitutional power. Obama officials then came into power with
these positions already entrenched-through a mixture of internal executive
action, judicial involvement, congressional legislation, and otherwise-and
thus entered offices that had already expressly linked the President's actions to
congressionally-authorized wartime authority. They came into power with the
intent, or at least the promise, of further dialing back the Executive's wartime
positions; yet, in many respects, they retained the status quo. More than that,
the constructive ambiguity in the Administration's current approach may
provide the President with even greater flexibility than the Bush-era support
53
test, despite its flaws, leaving the Executive operating in this greyish space.'

scant evidence and ascribing a "presumption of regularity" to intelligence reports); SAVAGE, supra note
58, at 300 (noting that after the Christmas Day attack and Obama's moratorium on repatriating Yemeni
detainees, "the Administration took increasingly aggressive stances in court").
150. See SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 274-79 (discussing debate regarding whether to label al
Shabaab an associated force).
151. See Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26.
152. See SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 274-79 (discussing continuing unresolved debate over the
status of al Shabaab).
153. We cannot ascertain with certainty the differences in the Administrations' internal
positions, but Bush-era briefs from 2008 suggest the Administration's stated theory relied upon finding a
group actually part of the al Qaeda organization, whereas Obama-era language suggests that an entirely
distinct group-even one that had parted ways with al Qaeda-could still fall within the definition. See
Parhat Brief, supra note 29. Contra Preston speech, supra note 2 (arguing that the President's AUMF
authority to use force against a group does not cease if there is a "split" or "disagreements between the
group and al-Qa'ida's current leadership"). Moreover, it was the Obama Administration, not the Bush
Administration, that relied upon this theory (in part) in legal analysis over the targeting and killing of a
U.S. citizen abroad.
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It is possible that Obama Administration officials initially retained the cobelligerency concept because they wanted to preserve the President's options,
and were anxious about giving up this power too quickly, before they fully
understood what they had inherited. 154 They may have later kept it either
because, barring major events, executive decisions tend to stick,' 5 5 or because
changes in domestic politics and world events made them decide they needed to
be able to exercise such power without going back to the congressional well.
Internal debates over the ideal interpretation of the AUMF, and the existence of
multiple internal theories, may have also played a role. Changing course is
more difficult than retaining the status quo, and thus requires some degree of
internal consensus or a firm decision maker; internal debate, particularly among
disaggregated decision makers, will more often result in staying the course than
a significant change in policy or legal position.1 56 Executive officials may thus
have opted for continuing to cite the concept "co-belligerency" for support,
while continuing to disagree internally over what that concept should be
interpreted to mean.
There is another counterintuitive factor that would have put pressure on
an expansive interpretation of the AUMF. Recent statements by President
Obama suggest that his reasons for relying on a broad reading of the 2001
AUMF for his wartime authority rather than returning to Congress for more
specific authority, are likely less connected to a desire for more power or
expanded war, but in fact the opposite: a fear that returning to Congress could
result in an authorization to the President of too much power, and an expansion
rather than a contraction of the war.' 5 1
And finally, this account does not mean that executive officials perceive
the President's authority to be wholly unbounded by law. To the contrary,
reporting on these internal deliberations suggests that executive officials
genuinely perceived the Executive to be constrained by an interpretation of the
AUMIF, evolving though it may be, and that they have limited their operations,
and the debate, at least to within the contours of the approaches I have outlined

154. See KLAIDMAN, supra note 144, at 58-60; SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 117-21 (discussing
March 13 Brief, supra note 39).
155. See Ingber, supranote 67, at 366.
156. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 605 (2001); Ingber, supra note 67, at
364-66 (discussing the "stickiness" of executive decisions). Political scientists refer to a related
phenomenon as "status quo bias."
157. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013) ("1 look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to
refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF's mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this

mandate further."). Nevertheless, an aggressive reading of the President's wartime powers, even
statutory powers, appears at least somewhat inconsistent with Obama's views as a presidential
candidate. See Charlie Savage, Barack Obama 's Q&A, BoS. GLOBE (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://www.boston.com/news/politics
/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/ (quoting Obama as a candidate, saying that "[tihe President
does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that
does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation . .. [Mlilitary action is most
successful when it is authorized and supported by the Legislative branch. It is always preferable to have
the informed consent of Congress prior to any military action").
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here.' 58 But however constraining the Administration might feel those
boundaries to be, their outer limits are far from clear to outside observers, and
these reports suggest that they remain ambiguous, flexible, and evolving to
insiders as well.
None of this narrative suggests a simple power grab on the part of either
Administration. But it does suggest that there is much going on beneath the
surface of executive branch legal positioning that informs and at times muddies
how the Executive is interpreting the law that binds it, even its own stated legal
positions. And yet even at a time of extraordinary calls for transparency from
executive overseers like courts, Congress, and civil society, these groups often
miss the subtler ambiguities in the Executive's positions that mask enormous
legal and policy differences beneath the surface, differences on positions that,
as with co-belligerency, may turn entirely on the Executive's internal
interpretations.
B. Failures in Judicialand CongressionalOversight
This brings us to the other, symbiotic component to this narrative. The
Executive could not have entrenched its expansive interpretation of the AUMF
without assistance from the courts and Congress who have neither demanded a
clear position from the Executive on the contours of its interpretation, nor
suggested one for themselves. Thus this story is also one of failures in both
judicial and congressional oversight over the President. A purely rational-actor
view of executive action here-an argument that this is merely an example of
the Executive making aggressive arguments about presidential power-cannot
account for the extent to which Congress and the courts have acquiesced in the
Executive's position on co-belligerency with virtually no real engagement with
the substance.
This congressional and judicial abdication is not for lack of engagement
generally by the courts and Congress in questioning the extent of the
59
Executive's asserted authority in the conflict with al Qaeda and now ISIS.'
And thus while the suggestion that the courts and Congress simply want to cede
the President flexible, unilateral authority to act against any groups he thinks
have a plausible connection to the conflict may explain the reasoning of some
actors,1 60 it cannot alone account for the inclination to find solace in the
Executive's position by those who have otherwise acted to check executive
authority.
There has been plenty of opportunity for both the courts and Congress to
dissect and pass judgment on the Executive's co-belligerency theory.
Throughout the evolving executive process discussed above, Congress was
engaging the Administration in parallel, both for the purposes of pushing back
against what were widely perceived as executive overreaches, as in the area of

158.
159.

See SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 274-79, 341-42.
See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text.

160.

See, e.g., AI-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (arguing that

international law does not constrain the President in wartime).

108

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

- [Vol. 42: 67

detainee mistreatment, and supporting executive prerogatives like detention and
military trial more generally.161 In doing so, Congress blessed the associated
forces concept, first obliquely, in the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, by
referencing the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, and then explicitly, in the
2006 Military Commissions Act, which defined its jurisdiction over persons
who are "part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces."l 62 Recent
congressional engagement suggests a continued interest in checking the
Executive's assertions of authority in this conflict. Testimony over the
Executive's understanding of its 2001 AUMF authority, for example, is rife
with members' questions about which groups the President is targeting in this
conflict, and about whether the Executive's interpretive expansion of the
AUMF inappropriately encroaches on Congress's war powers authority.1 63
And yet at no point did any Member of Congress do more than skim the
surface in an exchange over co-belligerency. In response to questions about the
reach of the AUMF, both lawmakers and executive officials have simply stated
that an extension of the AUMF to co-belligerents is supported by the
international laws of war.'" Even Senators skeptical about the Executive's
asserted authority have appeared disinclined to question the international law
content of the co-belligerency claim.' 65 Virtually none of these exchanges has
unearthed any additional content to the Executive's "co-belligerency"
approach.166

Questions of co-belligerency have arisen as well for courts, primarily
through the Guantanamo habeas litigation. Both the Bush and Obama
Administrations litigated challenges in court over the detention of individuals
who were part of forces "associated" with al Qaeda.' 67 And like Congress, the
161.

See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2009 Pub. L. No. 111-84 § 948(c), 123 Stat. 2199,

2576; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 11-84, 123 Stat. 2574 [hereinafter Detainee Treatment Act of 2005].

162.

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.

163. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014); 2013 SASC Hearing, supra note I
(Senators questioning executive officials regarding the list of groups the Executive considered falling
under the AUMF, but generally accepting, with no dissection, the concept of co-belligerency).
164. See sources cited supra note 163.
165. For example, in an exchange among Senators King, Levin, and DOD Acting General
Counsel Robert Taylor, Senator King expressed skepticism about the Executive's interpretation of the
AUMF to include groups not explicitly referenced. He accused the Administration of "invent[ing] this
term 'associated forces' that is nowhere in this document," and asserting "unlimited" power, which he
deemed "a very dangerous precedent." See 2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1, at 28. In response,
Senator Levin restated the Executive's position, that the domestic authority "to use force against a
foreign country or an organization . . . automatically extend[s] under the law of armed conflict to cobelligerents . . , to some entity that has aligned themselves [sic] with the specified entity against us, in
the fight against us," to which DOD Acting General Counsel Robert Taylor replied, "That is my
understanding. You have expressed it very well." Id. at 29.
166. See supra note 163. The lone substantive engagement uncovered on this involves an
exchange between a senator and an advocate (not an executive official). Senator Levin asked Kenneth
Roth, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, whether "under the law of war, for cobelligerents to be included in who the target or who the named source of attack is, they must, as I
understand it, join with the named belligerent and that they must also be participating in an attack on the
United States." Roth agreed, as long as the "original belligerent" (i.e. al Qaeda) continued to exist. See
2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1, at 121.
167. See March 13 Brief, supra note 39; Parhat Brief, supra note 29.
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courts have generally avoided dissecting the substantive legal theory behind the
co-belligerency concept or its limits, both when ratifying the government's
theory, and even when pushing back against it.
As I discussed above, the Bush Administration first relied on cobelligerency publicly in its unsuccessful litigation defending the detention of a
Uighur detainee, Huzaifa Parhat.'6 8 Parhat was part of a group of Uighur
detainees who had fled human rights abuses in China, took shelter in camps in
Afghanistan, fled the fighting during U.S. air strikes (which destroyed their
69
camp), and were ultimately handed over to U.S. officials in Pakistan.1 The
Executive's argument for Parhat's continued detention was based on his alleged
affiliation with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which the
Executive asserted was either an "associated force" of al Qaeda or part of the
organization itself, under "the established laws-of-war concept of 'cobelligerency."" 70 Though the Administration's internal reviewers of Parhat's
case suggested release, he remained at Guantanamo until 2009.171
Parhat was the first, and ultimately the only, case decided by the D.C.
Circuit in its statutorily-mandated review of the Bush Administration's
Combatant Status Review Tribunal designations.1 72 In noting the
Administration's argument that a group associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban
might fall within the term "organization" in the AUMF, the court assessed that
it "need not decide the precise meaning of the term," because the Government's
73
evidence was in any event insufficient to support its argument.1 Thus the
court found that the Government had not made its case, without ever grappling
with the content of co-belligerency or with the outer parameters of the AUMF
authority. 174

More typically, courts have taken the opposite approach; they have
simply ratified the Executive's co-belligerency claim in principle without
scrutinizing the substance."' Some have explicitly referenced the concept's

168.

See Parhat Brief, supra note 29.

169.

See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

170. See, e.g., Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 33-34. At this stage, the Administration's public
argument regarding co-belligerency was that it required an equivalency between the organizations. See,
e.g., Parhat,532 F.3d at 834 n. 4 ("Judge Sentelle: So you are dependent on the proposition that ETIM
is properly defined as being part of al Qaida, not that it aided or abetted, or aided or harbored al Qaida,
but that it's part off?] Mr. Katsas: Correct . . .. in order to fit them in the AUMF.").
171. This was based in part on the inadvisability of repatriating Parhat to China, where he
surely would have faced mistreatment. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 838.
172. Id at 854; see also Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, supra note 160.

173. Parhat,532 F.3d at 844.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 140 (2d Cir. 2014);
Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1936 (2014); see also
Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 KBF, 2012 WL 1721124, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012)
(questioning the Govemment's interpretive theory generally but finding that position "strongest ... with
respect to the definition of 'associated forces.' The Govemment argued that there is an accepted
definition of what constitutes 'associated force' under the Laws of War, which is defined in terms of
principles of co-belligerency and the Laws of War. Specifically, 'associated forces' is understood, at
least by the Govemment, to be 'individuals who, in analogous circumstances in a traditional
intemational armed conflict between the armed forces of opposing govemments, would be detainable
under principles of co-belligerency"').
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purported link to neutrality law."1 6 One of the few judges to elaborate on his
ratification of the theory beyond mere recitation of the government's standard
is Judge Bates of the D.C. District Court. Judge Bates justified his acceptance
of the theory in a 2009 case by describing the neutrality law-derived theory put
forward by Goldsmith and Bradley in their 2005 article, citing only that article
and those sources it cites.'" And yet, as I discussed above, it is not clear to
what extent the Obama administration was, in that 2009 case, intending to rely
upon or distance itself from the neutrality-derived test of the Goldsmith
Bradley article. Thus Judge Bates may have ratified the Executive's "cobelligerency" concept in principle, while relying on a substantive standard that
was not then, or may not now be, the Executive's intended test.
So, why have Members of Congress or the Judiciary not engaged more
thoroughly with the substantive content of the Executive's co-belligerency
theory? One reason the co-belligerency concept has taken root and persisted
despite its flaws is that it is poorly understood. And it is poorly understood in
ways that do not always lend themselves to easy recognition. Part of this
problem lies in its mixed origin in both domestic and international law.
International law experts, outside of a small cadre of U.S. national security law
wonks, are not generally inclined to follow or to wade into this debate because
of its specific U.S. domestic law focus. And domestic law players, relying in
part on the Executive's rhetoric about the "well-established" concept and
perhaps lacking the international law expertise to dissect it themselves, may
assume that the content has a more established pedigree under international law
than is actually the case."
This lack of substantive engagement with the underlying legal theory is
exacerbated by the chameleon-like nature of the Executive's position,
particularly as it is not clear what international law source is in fact guiding the
Executive's approach. It is hard to challenge a source if you do not know what
it is. And the only acknowledged source that the Executive has publicly relied
upon-the law of neutrality-is not a body of law in which most modem
lawyers, international or domestic, tend to have significant expertise. In fact, it
is a fairly archaic body of law that is at least partially obsolete today.
Congressmen and judges, as well as their staffers and advisers, may simply be
insufficiently versed in the nuances of neutrality law to be able to spot not only
its inapplicability, but also the ways in which it is being used improperly.

176. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hamlily v. Obama,
616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009). Oddly the only judge to critique the international law underlying the
co-belligerency theory is Judge Brown who, in an opinion in which she entirely dismissed the relevance
of international law to the Executive's detention authority, stated that even were it to apply, "the laws of
co-belligerency affording notice of war and the choice to remain neutral have only applied to nation
states. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 74 (1906). The [detainee's group] clearly
was not a state, but rather an irregular fighting force present within the borders of Afghanistan at the
sanction of the Taliban. Any attempt to apply the rules of co-belligerency to such a force would be folly,
akin to this court ascribing powers of national sovereignty to a local chapter of the Freemasons." Al-

Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873.
177. Harnlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
178. See generally Sinnar, supra note 14 (arguing that the Executive relies on "rule of law
tropes" to suggest it is employing a clear legal standard even when it is not).
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By contrast, the "active hostilities" test bears striking similarity to a wellestablished international law approach to determining the parties to the conflict:
that of the ICTY's jurisprudence in the Tadid case.179 And yet there the
Executive has never expressed a link between its test and that case or
subsequent ICTY jurisprudence that might provide additional analysis for how
to approach these concepts of an "organized armed group" or the determination
of hostilities sufficient to make a group a party to a conflict. Thus the courts
and Congress and others have not themselves looked to that source in
considering the merits of the Executive's position.
The Executive's position lacks transparency at every level: what is the
legal theory, what is the source for that theory, and even whether it is truly
being forthcoming about its position. 80 This is perhaps worse than a simple
lack of transparency over the Executive's position. This is not simply a
function of not providing particular information or a legal theory to the public
or to other critical actors. The public has generally accepted that the Executive
has not revealed the facts underlying many of its decisions in the conflict with
al Qaeda.is t But there has been increasing pressure on the Executive over the
last decade and a half to provide, if not the underlying facts, then at a
minimum, its legal positions in this conflict. The Executive has at times
claimed that it has provided an extraordinary level of disclosure to the public
regarding its wartime legal reasoning, and this may be true. Nevertheless, as the
co-belligerency case study demonstrates, the Executive's public statements
82
may not always align perfectly with its internal thinking.' Or more to the
point, the Executive is not one unitary being, and the public statements and
other pieces of evidence that come out of the executive branch do not always
capture the full extent of the interpretive and policy disputes that may be
occurring beneath the surface. Ambiguity or flexibility in executive
pronouncements may be less about an intentional power grab by any one actor,
and more about an inability to reach consensus internally, and thus a need to
leave open room for different interpretations or paper over these differences
between executive officials.' 83 The result is that the public, courts and Congress
84
are left with a false sense of transparency, the mere veneer of a legal rule.1
This is worse than directly withholding information, because the public is less
able to recognize that this withholding is taking place.

179.

See infra Part II.

180.

Id.

181. There are, of course, notable exceptions. Many NGOs and others have called on the
Executive to release, for example, concrete information regarding the results of its drone strikes. Others
have suggested a public accounting of the underlying facts the Government relies upon in reaching its
targeting decisions. In the context of Guantanamo habeas, litigants have at the very least been successful
in requiring the Executive to put forward factual information regarding the basis for detention. See, e.g.,

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
182. See generally Sinnar, supra note 14.
183. Or perhaps the matter was decided definitively in 2012 when Jeh Johnson announced the
"entered the fight" test, but subsequent debates and waffling within the Executive have muddied the
extent to which that test is strictly construed. See Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26.
184. DYZENHAUS, supra note 14, at 3,42, 50.
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With its associated forces theory, the Executive has suggested a
somewhat strict approach (to an already expansive reading of the AUMF) by
asserting its two-pronged "entered the fight" approach. It has also left a trail of
evidence suggesting that internal actors may read into that explicit approach
more flexibility than it suggests, or that some officials may have a different test
in mind altogether, and may simply be continuing to rely on the test that they
had been using previously, and which they at times continue to reference. By
relying on a concept of co-belligerency without explaining its content, its
source, or the contours of the Executive's understanding, the Executive
simultaneously suggests foundation in an established legal principle and
muddies the waters.' It has not, after all, revealed what it means by cobelligerency in this context. And as this Article demonstrates, there are several
possibilities. Perhaps the "Executive" in its many component pieces intends all
of them.
C. Alternatives to Co-Belligerency
Reliance on principles drawn from international law and specifically this
concept of co-belligerency-however it is understood-to understand the scope
of the AUMF has become fairly entrenched through two presidential
administrations, judicial deference and congressional acquiescence. But this
result was not inevitable, and along the way there have been alternative
possibilities for interpreting the scope of the AUMF available to the courts,
Congress, and to the Executive.
One is a strict, text-driven approach. Some scholars have advocated
reading the AUfW to apply only to those groups specifically referenced,
namely the Taliban and al Qaeda (which are not explicitly named, but are
widely understood to be the entities contemplated by the statute).'" Under such
an approach, the President would need to return to Congress for specific
authorization in order to use force against other groups, whether or not they had
an affiliation to al Qaeda.187 Even a narrow reading, however, requires some
interpretive approach to determining which actors fall within the orbit of al
Qaeda and the Taliban. In a traditional armed conflict, such a question has a
fairly straightforward answer: members of the armed forces typically identify
themselves as such, wear uniforms, sleep in barracks. International law
classifies such individuals as combatants, who may be detained or directly
185. See generally Sinnar, supra note 14 (describing how the Executive's public invocation of
traditional "rule of law tropes," while deviating from them in secret, serves to protect executive branch
national security decision-making from external review).
186. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 127-28.
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Id. at 126 ("If new groups emerge that pose a threat sufficient to warrant independent use-

of-force authority, the government should affirmatively and publicly identify them and obtain from
Congress specific authorization to use force against those groups."). Another set of scholars advocates a
new congressional statute that would provide more flexible authority to the President, requiring him to
identify the list of groups he was targeting, but permitting him discretion to update that list based on
Congressionally-provided criteria. See Robert Chesney et al., A Statutory Framework for Next
Generation
Terrorist
Threats,
HOOVER
INST.
(2013),
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-GenerationTerrorist-Threats.pdf.

Co-Belligerency

2017]

113

targeted at almost all times, but who also have a right to participate in
hostilities, as distinct from civilians. But in a conflict with a terrorist
organization, even the simple question of who is a member, and specifically
who is a detainable or a targetable member, is fraught. The current approach,
constant across the Administrations, looks by analogy to international law for
answers for this question as well. But this is not the only viable approach.
Other approaches for interpreting the AUMF appeal to areas of domestic
law, rather than international law, to understand its scope. Early executive
branch explanations of al Qaeda's structure and affiliations suggested that
officials looked to the domestic legal definition of terms like "organization" in
188
Other options
order to determine who might fall within al Qaeda's scope.
include looking to analogues from criminal law, such as participation in a
criminal enterprise. Analogues from criminal law generally require a greater
degree of actual participation in the hostile acts of the organization before
individuals may be held accountable, in contrast to the international laws of
war, under which combatants are considered members of the armed force from
the moment they enlist, regardless of their actual activities. Wartime analogies
thus cast a generally wider net, and involve less process. For this and countless
other reasons-including the longstanding precedent of looking to the laws of
war to regulate the use of force abroad-intemational law may have appealed
to decision makers as a better fit.
None of the interpretive approaches I discuss in this Article foreclose the
possibility of Congress providing new statutory authority that more clearly
delineates the extent to which new groups or individuals may be covered under
the AUMF or future force authorizations. This cuts in both directions. Congress
could rein in the President's current interpretation of the statute; it could repeal
or revise the 2001 AUMF, and craft a more explicitly tailored authorization in
its place. Alternatively, Congress could instead clarify that it intends to
delegate fairly flexible authority to the President to determine the groups that
should come within the statute.
In the interim, the co-belligerency theory simply operates as an
interpretive default rule for reading the President's use of force authority. This
theory rests on a legal fiction of congressional intent: that Congress must have
intended that executive officials understand the President's statutory war
powers to extend to groups that join the fight, as that concept would be
understood under international law. For this default rule to work effectively,
however, Congress, courts, and the public need to understand precisely what
the default presumption is. They need to know how the President and executive
branch officials interpret such use of force authorizations, both for the purposes
of determining whether to further expand or cabin the current AUMF, and to
understand how the Executive will read future authorizations. Thus, while there
are both doctrinal and policy reasons to prefer one test over another, the longview imperative is that there be one clear theory by which all these actors

188.

See, e.g., Parhat Brief, supra note 29.
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recognize that the Executive will construe this kind of force authorization,
absent further clarification from Congress.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CO-BELLIGERENCY STORY

This Article makes two primary claims. First, as a matter of both practice
and doctrine, this article demonstrates that no one, including those within the
executive branch, has a full understanding of the scope of the President's
authority under the AUMF, or even the scope of what the President has asserted
is his AUMF authority. This has obvious ramifications for our ability to
understand, let alone to cabin, the current conflict. And if left unchecked,
today's murky understanding will continue to govern an expansive
interpretation of wartime force authorizations going forward.
Second, this Article uses the co-belligerency story as a case study to
explore how a self-created legal norm can serve simultaneously as both
constraint and enhancement on executive power. Co-belligerency is an
executive-made greyish space in the law, a phenomenon dangerously close but
not quite equivalent to what David Dyzenhaus has called a "legal grey hole."' 89
The co-belligerency story is a narrative of a creative idea that became
entrenched law, but in the process lost much of its shape. The result has been
neither a clear limit on Presidential power, nor an executive branch run
completely amok, but rather an amorphously-defined pool of discretionary
authority that few if any fully understand.
This case study also unearths a question about the invocation of
international law to interpret domestic law. Specifically, how should
international law inform domestic legal authorities that speak to foreign affairs
powers, when the international law in question is vague or there is no one clear
international law rule on point?
A.

The Scope of the President'sStatutory War Powers

The co-belligerency story suggests that no one really knows for sure how
the Executive is interpreting its statutory powers in this conflict, including
those within the executive branch itself. What is clear is that the courts and
Congress have both failed in their investigation and oversight of the
Executive's position. The scope of the President's statutory authority to use
force is, after all, a question of domestic law-one of statutory interpretationand the Executive's position is based at least in part on a legal fiction of
congressional intent. Yet members of Congress have abdicated their
responsibility to perform that oversight. Some have suggested concern over the
scope of the Executive's statutory authority, only to then defer wholly to an
executive interpretation of that statute without making any effort to understand
that interpretation.' 90 Even more tortuous, these very members have taken
comfort in the idea that judicial sanction for the Executive's interpretation of
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DYZENHAUS, supra note 14, at 3.
See, e.g., supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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their own statute should somehow legitimize that reading and absolve them of
the need to draw their own judgment of that interpretation or otherwise to
clarify their intent.1 91
This Article has dissected the possible options for interpreting the AUMF,
and discussed the relative merits and disadvantages to each. But whatever the
precise test employed, what is most imperative is that there be one approach,
and that it be transparent and understood by the relevant players: courts,
Congress, NGOs, and also executive branch officials themselves. The
substance of that test is important, surely, and scholars, members of Congress,
judges, and NGOs, can and should debate what that test should be. But to do so
effectively they must understand what they do and do not already know about
the Executive's position. There are many potential approaches to both
interpreting the current AUMF and to determining future authorizations to the
President. International law may or may not be an appropriate source for
92
Perhaps a
determining the contours of a conflict with a non-state actor.'
thorough
after
Or
perhaps
ideal.
is
itself
text
in
the
approach
strictly-tailored
flexible
significant
with
the
Executive
provide
to
vote
might
Congress
debate
authority. But it is critical that those charged with checking executive authority
know where that flexibility lies, and where the Executive is operating within
clearly defined parameters. Wherever the approach ultimately lands, this
interpretive mechanism is merely a default rule; Congress can draft around it.
But Congress can only do so-and the courts and public can only judge its
merits-if all understand how the interpretive mechanism actually operates.
Today, the Executive's co-belligerency approach does not provide that clarity,
and instead hovers dangerously close to a legal grey hole, a mere veneer of law
that suggests a clearer rule than it truly provides, and which operates to stave
off interference in the Executive's position while simultaneously affording the
93
President significant discretion to act.1
B. Invoking InternationalLaw to Interpret Domestic Authority
The co-belligerency story demonstrates that there are reasons to be
concerned with attempts at international law adventurism when interpreting
domestic law. While the use of international law to inform domestic rules has
an established pedigree, it can be abused.1 94 This is particularly so in the
modem era in which those charged with checking the Executive's domestic
authority often lack expertise in international law. Reliance on international law
to inform domestic law can instead help to create, intentionally or not, a legal
grey hole of flexible and amorphous executive power. Here, the Executive's
invocation of a little known concept from international law to interpret its
domestic statutory authority enabled it to promote a flexible and ultimately

19 1.

Id.

192. For a discussion of how to determine when international law is an appropriate tool for
interpreting domestic constraints, see Ingber, supra note 12.
193. See DYZENHAUS, supra note 14, at 3, 42, 50.
194. See Ingber, supra note 12.
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expansive understanding of that authority with very little pushback from the
courts or Congress.
How should international law appropriately inform the domestic law in
this context, namely the President's statutory authority under the AUMF? One
question that this case study raises-and which I will have to reserve to future
work-is, even when it is appropriate to look to international law to inform a
particular domestic context, how does one determine which particular
substantive norm is the appropriate norm to invoke and how does one define it?
Among the questions packed into this are: Which body of international law is
best suited to this task? In areas of controversy or disagreement, how does one
determine which rule properly governs? When interpreting a congressional
statute, is it necessary that Congress has appeared to have accepted a particular
international law norm, or is it sufficient that the executive branch espouse it?
And need the international law norm have been well-established at the time of
the statute's enactment, or need it be a well-established consensus opinion
today? Or is it enough simply that the Executive today deems the norm to be
the best-or even just a plausible-reading of the law? What does one do when
there is no appropriate international law test on point?
The co-belligerency story raises all of these questions. There exists no
one clear and established international law test that is perfectly on point to
determine when a non-state armed group joins a pre-existing conflict between a
state and non-state actor. Executive officials have thus relied on different
theories over the years. The early test that officials proposed during the middle
of the Bush Administration relied upon a creative take on the historic body of
neutrality law to understand the parameters of a domestic statute authorizing
force against al Qaeda. 195 That body of law was not formally applicable to the
al Qaeda conflict as a matter of international law, and thus it required a novel
spin on that law in order to map it onto this context. Moreover, even putting
aside the applicability of the body of neutrality law as a whole, the Bush-era
theory required a tweaking of the neutrality law rule itself in order to craft a test
for the domestic law purpose.
Under no circumstances could one argue that this novel theory of
international law was an established or consensus approach to determining the
parties to a conflict under international law in 2001, when the AUMF was
passed. Nor was it, at the time, the U.S. Government's understanding of
international law governing such conflicts. No evidence suggests that it was a
consensus approach to international law at any point during the years in which
the Bush Administration invoked the test to interpret the AUMF. Nor is there
evidence to suggest that it is the international law governing such conflicts
today. 196

There nevertheless remains a question as to the extent to which the
Executive might plausibly promote this understanding of the law governing
force against non-state actors as a matter of international law. The U.S.
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For the detailed discussion of this test and its problems, see supra Part II.
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President has some real power to move custom in areas where there remains a
lack of clarity over the international law rule. But that is not the question before
us here. The question here is whether this creative theory should be employed
to inform a domestic statute informing and constraining the President's power.
For these purposes the presumption shifts: a lack of clarity in international law
should not give the President license to interpret his domestic authorities with
abandon. To the contrary, to the extent international law informs domestic
powers, we must consider that we can only presume congressional intent to
incorporate existing international law rules. The extent to which those rules
must be in existence at the time of the statute's enactment or in existence at the
time of interpretation may be an open question. But the neutrality theory fails
under either theory.
The Tadid theory is also flawed for the reasons discussed in Part II. But at
a minimum it may serve as a floor for a more tailored yet still expansive
reading of the AUMF. Tadid has the benefit of being a well-established test,
both now and at the time of the AUMF's enactment. Because Tadid creates a
standard for determining the threshold point at which a NIAC comes into
existence, and not for determining when parties join a pre-existing NIAC, it
may well be that the test for the latter should be less stringent. International law
may well permit parties to act beyond Tadid's bounds. And states may wish to
try to push on those bounds and develop custom in this area. But today there is
no existing test for what that might be, and thus it cannot serve as a limiting
principle for an expansive view of domestic authority. Tadid is the only theory
that passes the brief guidelines I discuss above. This does not mean that
Congress cannot go further to authorize more discretion to the President
beyond what Tadid would permit, but without further action on its part we
cannot assume it.
There is room for debate over how precisely international law should
inform domestic law, and how we should define the international law norm in
doing so.m I certainly find persuasive arguments in favor of importing a
clearly established, longstanding principle of international law to help define
the contours of an otherwise ambiguous domestic statute. I also find plausible
arguments in favor of assuming congressional intent to keep up with changing
times and incorporate a norm that has evolved over time to a new modem
consensus. And I think it might be reasonable to argue the complete inverse as
well: that we should interpret a statute as incorporating even a controversial
international law norm that was in play at the time of the statute, if that norm
was at the time clearly accepted by the United States. But I think it is a bridge
too far for the Executive and others to assume congressional intent to import
into an existing statute an international law theory that neither was the position
of the United States at the time of the statute, nor long-standing generally, nor
accepted today by the international community as an established norm. For our
purposes here, while it may make sense to assume congressional intent to
197. This case study forms part of a broader project on the distinct ways that international law
informs domestic law interpretation. A future work will consider how to determine the appropriate
content of an international law norm when we look to it to inform domestic law.
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authorize force against all existing parties to a conflict, I do not find it realistic
that Congress intended in the 2001 statute to delegate to the President the
authority to declare war against new actors, simply based on an argument that
international law permits it.' 98
C.

Checking Executive Powerfrom Without and Within

Most broadly, the co-belligerency story complicates competing narratives
today about the potential for the Executive to self-constrain in the absence of
real external oversight. It is neither a cynical tale of an imperial power-hungry
Executive, nor a happy account of a presidency perfectly restrained by the
institutional forces promoting the rule of law humming away within the
executive branch. Instead, this story both demonstrates and raises concerns
about the phenomenon that has been called a second-best alternative check on
executive authority: the internal separation of powers, the web of actors within
the executive branch who operate to rein in executive prerogative. 199
There has been much interest in recent years in what has seemed a
demographic explosion of lawyers operating within the executive branch, and
the significant involvement of these lawyers in all aspects of executive
decision-making. Particular attention has focused on executive lawyering in
the national security arena. 200 Presidential powers experts have noticed a
decline of centralized power in legal offices like the Office of Legal Counsel at
the Justice Department, in favor of a more disaggregated approach of lawyers
meetings drawn from lawyers throughout the administration. 201 Some scholars
have suggested that this decentralization of legal advice must lead to legal
opportunism, strategic cherry-picking on the part of the President who might
simply choose his preferred legal advice from among an array of his advisers'
suggestions. 202
The image of a unitary executive plucking his preferred legal advice from
a lineup of his advisers provides an overly simplistic, and inaccurate, account
of how decision-making functions inside an enormous behemoth such as the
executive branch. It also misunderstands the consequences of a trajectory away
from centralized decision-making. What this and other accounts of executive
lawyering overlook is that today's disaggregated approach to legal decision198. It is not clear that Congress could have delegated away that authority entirely, even if it
intended to do so.
199. See, e.g., Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous

Branchfrom Within, 115 YALE L. J. 2314, 2316 (2006) (identifying, and proposing a strengething of, the
internal separation of powers); Gillian Metzger, The InterdependentRelationship Between Internal and
External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L. J. 423, 426-35 (2009) (hailing the benefits of the internal
separation of powers, and discussing its interdependency with external checks on the President).
200. New York Times journalist Charlie Savage has even written a 600-plus page popular tome
on the subject. See SAVAGE, supra note 58.
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making resembles much less one decider choosing among many choices, but
rather a group of disparate actors with differing instincts, biases, and goals
working together to make a decision. The result is inevitably one of
compromise. One of the results of such group decision-making is that when
these disparate actors cannot agree on one clear position, they will of necessity
203
Flexible or
employ ambiguous language to paper over their differences.
ambiguous executive legal positions are often not necessarily the result of
intentional, conscious power grabs, but rather represent the reality of group
decision-making, and attempts to mask internal disagreement and come to a
decision for the moment that permits continued debate among the actors until
they are truly forced to decide. Because of this bias toward flexibility, a
practice of leaving options open will inevitably, even if unintentionally, lead to
2
a ratcheting up of power to the President. 04
And yet, for all the problems inherent in relying on internal constraints to
check an otherwise all-powerful Executive, in certain very important areas
these internal constraints may well be our only hope. For the clearest message
coming out of the co-belligerency story is that the courts and Congress-while
purporting to provide active oversight of the Executive on this precise matterhave utterly failed to do so. Despite seeming to ratify the Executive's theory in
principle, neither the courts nor Congress have shown sufficient inclination or
ability to look behind the co-belligerency concept to understand its meaning or
how the Executive is employing it.
A cynical view of this account is that Congress and judges have simply
looked the other way rather than make difficult decisions about the proper
limits of executive power in war. On this account, reliance on this cobelligerency concept-which they may not fully understand but which sounds
in international law and suggests constraint-allows them to do so. A less
cynical but equally disconcerting narrative might be that judges and members
of Congress simply do not realize how little they know about co-belligerency
and how the Executive uses it. Both narratives suggest that reliance on this term
provides a "fagade" of oversight, and that if the only operating constraints on
the President were from these two branches, his authority in this area would
truly be a legal grey hole. 205 I have therefore used the concept of a greyish
space in this Article not because of the existence of effective external checks,
but rather because of evidence that the executive branch has truly operated as if
constrained to some extent by internal forces enforcing self-imposed limits, at
least within this amorphous and evolving space that it itself has created.
CONCLUSION

Accounts of executive power today, particularly in the murkiest areas of
national security law, often tend toward either the trusting or the cynical. Either
203.

See Ingber, supra note 65.
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205. See DYZENHAUS, supra note 14, at 3 (warning against the existence of legal black holeslawless zones-as well as legal grey holes, where "there is the fagade or form of the rule of law rather
than any substantive protections"); Sinnar, supra note 14.
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the internal organs of the executive branch are working efficiently to guide and
constrain executive decision-making within legal limits, or else the story is an
entirely different one of a presidency run rampant, unchecked by the other
branches, perhaps even spurred from within by nefarious power-hungry
bureaucrats.
The reality lies in a middle space. Nefarious actors may exist, but they are
not the norm. Institutional players may truly see themselves as bound by the
rule of law, but, in operating so entirely within their closed-off, exclusive, and
cabined space, it is a rule of law that often only they are truly able to
understand. (And as this Article explores, even those internal actors do not
always understand the legal rules they feel constrained by.) Outsiders may see
in this lack of transparency nefarious intentions. They may see in the lack of
clear rules an intention to create these grey spaces or even legal black holes,
rather than an intention to truly constrain the presidency. Neither of these
accounts gets it precisely right, but that does not mean that the reality has
settled yet on the appropriate balance.
This middle space should be no less concerning to those who fear the
aggrandizement of executive power. Nefarious intentions are not a prerequisite
to the inexorable ratcheting up of executive claims to authority. Indeed, this
story suggests challenges for those Presidents who rise to power hoping to rein
it in. Ultimately, it may be that internal forces simply will never be sufficient as
the sole constraints on executive power. But until the courts and Congress step
in, they may well be all we have.

